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 Urban Agriculture and Other 
Green Uses: Remaking 
the Shrinking City 
 Catherine J. LaCroix* 
 For many decades , the primary challenge of land use law has been 
how to promote and channel growth. 1 Cities encourage new construc-
tion and high-value economic activity, 2 at the same time that they try to 
manage land use patterns through a city plan. 3 Disputes over the proper 
use of eminent domain arise when cities use this power to encourage 
private development; 4 disputes over the proper scope of regulatory 
power arise when regulators attempt to shape density by restricting de-
velopment. 5 There is an entire body of law on the topic of how to con-
*Adjunct Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University; former partner, Hogan & 
Hartson, L.L.P., Washington, D.C. (environmental practice group). A.B. Harvard Col-
lege, J.D. University of Michigan. I appreciate the helpful comments and suggestions 
offered by Melvyn Durchslag, Jonathan Entin, Alan Madry, and Matthew Rossman. 
I am grateful for research assistance from Adam Morris on the Cleveland and Cuyahoga 
County Land Banks.
1. E.g., Stuart Meck, Growing Smart Legislative Guidebook xxvii-xxviii 
(American Planning Association 2002) (explaining the development of land use law 
as necessary to “manage growth and change”); Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer & 
Thomas E. Roberts, Land Use Planning and Development Regulation Law 
18-22 (2d ed. 2007) (history of land use law focused on addressing the challenges of 
urban growth); Daniel R. Mandelker, Land Use Law 3.01 (5th ed. 2002) (compre-
hensive plans are “future oriented” and “project the development of a community to a 
future point . . . in the community’s growth.”); Karina Pallagst, Shrinking Cities: Plan-
ning Challenges from an International Perspective, in Cities Growing Smaller 10 
(2008), available at http://www.cudc.kent.edu/shrink/CGS/cgsdownload.html.
2. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 474 (2005) (upholding New 
London’s use of eminent domain to take plaintiff’s small home, to revitalize a blighted 
area by comprehensively redeveloping it to include a “waterfront conference hotel,” 
restaurants, shopping, a museum, and “research and development offi ce space”).
3. See, e.g., Mandelker, supra note 1, at 3.01 (comprehensive plans “plan for the 
physical development of the community”).
4. E.g., Kelo, 545 U.S. 469. The Kelo decision set off an upsurge in “anti-Kelo” state 
legislative initiatives, designed to limit the use of regulatory takings to foster redevelop-
ment by private industry. See Lynn E. Blais, Urban Revitalization in the Post-Kelo Era, 
34 Fordham Urb. L.J. 657 (2007).
5. See infra Part III; e.g., Constr. Indus. Ass’n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th 
Cir. 1975); 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Wasco County Court, 703 P.2d 207 (Or. 1985). Or-
egon’s comprehensive land use planning, with restrictions on development, led to a popu-
lar revolt in Ballot Measure 37, adopted in 2004 (and a counter-measure three years later, 
as the effects of Measure 37 began to be felt). See MacPherson v. Dep’t of Admin. Servs., 
130 P.3d 308 (Or. 2006) (en banc) (upholding the constitutionality of Measure 37).
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1485596
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strain rapid growth. 6 The modern “smart growth” movement focuses on 
areas where growth is pronounced; it seeks to make it better. 7 Thus the 
underlying assumption of land use law is that economic and population 
growth is both our expectation and, when properly shaped, our goal. 8 
Historically, declining cities have focused on fostering growth and de-
velopment. 9 Urban redevelopment efforts seek to attract businesses to 
lift depressed areas from their slump. 10 Nobody wants stagnation; the 
cure is growth. We often assume that if a city is not growing there is 
something wrong. 11 
 In the last several years, however, some cities have begun to openly 
address a previously unacknowledged truth: some cities will and do 
shrink. 12 They lose population and have no foreseeable prospect of re-
gaining it. Certainly we all know this happens: the ghost town is a stan-
dard feature of the lore of the American West. But in modern times, 
shrinkage has not been an outcome that cities plan for, or embrace. 
 The land use planning community has begun to grapple with the 
issue of the shrinking city. Efforts at institutions such as the Kent State 
University Cleveland Urban Design Collaborative 13 and the Shrinking 
Cities Group at the Institute of Urban and Regional Development at 
 6. See infra text accompanying note 89. The topic of growth management and 
smart growth consumes an entire chapter in two standard treatises. Juergensmeyer & 
Roberts, supra note 1; Mandelker, supra note 1, at 3.01.
 7. Meck, supra note 1, at xxxi (offering comprehensive recommendations to revise 
and improve land use controls, stating “we must grow in a smarter way”).
 8. See id.
 9. See, e.g., Laura M. Bassett, Tax Increment Financing as a Tool for Redevelop-
ment: Attracting Private Investment to Serve a Public Purpose—The Example of Michi-
gan, 41 Urb. Law. 755 (2009) (use of tax increment fi nancing to attract high-value new 
investment); Wendell E. Pritchett, Beyond Kelo: Thinking About Urban Development 
in the 21st Century, 22 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 895, 909 (2006) (explaining that inner ring 
suburbs are constrained by the lack of developable land and need to fi nd ways to foster 
tax revenue growth through economic development).
10. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 474 (2005); Bassett, supra note 9, 
at 756.
11. If a city is not growing, we refer—not to stability—but stagnation or “blight” 
(sometimes loosely defi ned to mean—in essence—unchanged over many years). See, 
e.g., Pritchett, supra note 9, at 911 (explaining that “blight” designation in Lakewood, 
Ohio is used for any residence without three bedrooms, an attached two-car garage, and 
central air conditioning); id. at 912-13, 915 (fi nding that cities and developers tend to 
desire growth).
12. See, e.g., infra note 24 and accompanying text.
13. Cleveland Urban Design Collaborative, Who We Are, www.cudc.kent.edu/
a-whoweare/whoweare.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2010). As the site explains, the Urban 
Design Collaborative
is a community service organization with a professional staff of architects, plan-
ners, urban designers, and landscape designers committed to improving the quality of 
urban places through technical design assistance, research and advocacy. Supported 
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Berkeley 14 focus on the shrinking city with this question in mind: how 
can we achieve managed, “smart” shrinkage? How can a shrinking city 
be made a viable, pleasant place for its remaining residents? 
 Shrinking cities pose new legal questions. What constraints might 
land use law impose on a city’s goals of diminishing its infrastructure 
responsibilities, downzoning its land to less intensive uses, or taking 
other steps consistent with a goal of managed shrinkage? This article 
explores some key issues, using current developments in Cleveland, 
Ohio—including an active movement to re-green the city through urban 
agriculture and other green uses—as an example. Part I describes the 
shrinking cities concept. Part II shows that, although managed shrink-
age is a new idea that runs contrary to the land use tradition, existing 
land use regulatory tools can be used to implement it. Part III considers 
possible legal challenges, particularly takings claims, that the shrinking 
city effort might face, particularly when downzoning urban property 
for urban agriculture and other green uses. It concludes that takings 
issues, though potentially diffi cult, can for the most part be overcome. 
Part III also briefl y considers the fairness issues associated with down-
zoning and the limitations of the current legal structure for revitalizing 
brownfi elds in a setting where traditional redevelopment is unlikely. 
This article concludes that thoughtful, careful city planning can help a 
city remake itself, even if that process involves encouraging green uses, 
such as urban agriculture, that do not fi t our traditional understanding 
of an urban environment. 
 I. The Shrinking Cities Challenge 
 What is a shrinking city? There is no single defi nition, 15 but several cit-
ies of the American Northeast can tell you they know it when they see 
it. Detroit, Cleveland, Buffalo, and Youngstown, to name a few, share 
similar characteristics: long-term trends of signifi cant population de-
cline, associated with the loss or diminution of the industries that caused 
the cities to grow in the fi rst place. 16 Buffalo’s population, for example, 
by the College of Architecture and Environmental Design at Kent State University, 
the CUDC offers urban design expertise and applied research in the service of urban 
communities, design professionals, and public policy efforts.
Id.
14. Shrinking Cities Group, www-iurd.ced.berkeley.edu/scg/ (last visited Mar. 30, 
2010).
15. Pallagst, supra note 1, at 7.
16. Lorlene Hoyt & André Leroux, Voices From the Forgotten Cities 
(2007), available at www.youngstown2010.com (follow “forgotten cities” hyperlink); 
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has dropped from 580,000 in 1950 to 279,000 in 2005; 17 Cleveland’s 
has dropped from a high of 914,808 in 1950 to approximately 438,042 
in 2007. 18 While the suburbs of both of these cities are relatively robust 
(though with some signs of decay at the inner ring) 19 the cities them-
selves are hollowed out by dramatic population loss. Jobs in industries 
such as steel and auto-making are gone and are not expected to return; 20 
the cities are victims of a “convergence of factors—poverty, property 
speculation, fi scal instability of local government, poorly performing 
schools and crime.” 21 While each city endeavors to foster development 
and redevelopment to combat decay, 22 each city also has come to the 
conclusion that it cannot expect signifi cant population increases in the 
foreseeable future. 23 
 From a land use perspective, the term “shrinking city” is a misnomer; 
perhaps “hollowing city” would be more appropriate. Although the typ-
ical shrinking city has experienced signifi cant population decline, the 
physical footprint of the city itself remains the same size. Cleveland, for 
example, is a relatively lightly populated core in a sprawling metropoli-
tan area. Thus the fundamental land use question for such cities is what 
to do with their unused or under-used land in the core. 
Joseph Schilling, Buffalo as the Nation’s First Living Laboratory for Reclaiming Vacant 
Properties in Cities Growing Smaller 33 (2008).
17. Schilling, supra note 16, at 33.
18. Cleveland Land Lab, Re-Imagining a More Sustainable Cleveland: 
Citywide Strategies for Reuse of Vacant Land 2 (2008), www.cudc.kent.edu/
shrink/images/reimagining_fi nal_screen-res.pdf [hereinafter Re-Imagining].
19. The Ohio First Suburbs Consortium was established to address problems of urban 
decay in inner ring suburbs in cities across Ohio. As its mission statement explains: 
“Although the OFSC member-communities are diverse in character, most are built-out 
or approaching that condition and virtually all are facing severe economic and fi scal 
stress.” Ohio First Suburbs Consortium, www.fi rstsuburbs.org (last visited Mar. 30, 
2010). This is a condition found in other inner ring suburbs nationwide. See Pritchett, 
supra note 9, at 909 (suggesting inner ring suburbs are constrained by the lack of de-
velopable land and need to fi nd ways to foster tax revenue growth through economic 
development).
20. E.g., Pallagst, supra note 1. (attributing urban core population losses to both sub-
urbanization and the “downward spiral” of the manufacturing industry). Youngstown’s 
City Plan poignantly notes that, “When steel’s reign came to a screeching halt and the 
smoke literally cleared, Youngstown was left with no vision and no plan to deal with the 
aftermath. . . .” Thomas A. Finnerty Jr. et al., Youngstown 2010 Citywide Plan 
14 (2010), available at www.youngstown2010.com (follow “About Youngstown” to 
“Youngstown 2010 Citywide Plan”).
21. Schilling, supra note 16, at 33.
22. See, e.g., City of Cleveland, Development Projects, http://planning.city.cleve
land.oh.us/projects/index.php (last visited Mar. 30, 2010); Youngstown Offi ce of Eco-
nomic Development, http://www.ytowndevelopment.com (last visited Mar. 30, 2010).
23. E.g., Re-Imagining, supra note 18 (“Re-Imagining . . . starts from the premise 
that the loss of population over the last 60 years is not likely to be reversed in the near 
term . . .”).
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 Several of the shrinking cities have considered how best to address 
the problem of underpopulation and varying approaches have been ad-
opted. Youngstown has decided to abandon streets, close down infra-
structure, and consolidate its remaining population in selected areas. 24 
In Detroit, there is a grassroots pattern of re-suburbanization, as remain-
ing homeowners acquire adjacent lots for home and garden expansion. 25 
Cleveland is taking a range of steps of which three are signifi cant here: 
the State of Ohio has approved legislation establishing a county-wide 
land bank with the power to acquire and demolish buildings on vacant 
properties, 26 a coalition of government and non-governmental interests 
has developed a multi-faceted vision for the future in a recent report, 
 Re-Imagining a More Sustainable Cleveland, 27 and Cleveland has ad-
opted a specifi c zoning category for urban gardens, including market 
gardens. 
 Both the land bank and the Re-Imagining report respond to the same 
problem: the large number of vacant lots and abandoned buildings found 
throughout the most blighted areas of cities like Cleveland. While the 
city’s population has been declining for years, the blight accelerated 
with the mortgage lending abuses that began to attract attention in 
Cleveland as early as 2000. 28 As of March 2009, estimates of vacant 
houses in the city of Cleveland were as high as 15,000, or more than one 
in thirteen. 29 Most of Cleveland’s vacant houses are owned by lenders 
24. As Youngstown’s Plan notes, the city has lost half its population since 1960. 
Finnerty et al., supra note 20, at 30. Large numbers of abandoned properties dot 
the city. Id. at 36. As a result, the city concluded that “Not all infrastructure can be 
maintained and not all neighborhoods can be returned to their past sustainability.” Id. at 
37. The current plan reallocates uses: some abandoned areas of housing and unneces-
sary commercial zones are redesignated “industrial green”—a new category of “non-
polluting environmentally friendly” industrial use. Id. at 49-51. Overall, the land use 
plan calls for a thirty percent decrease in land intended for residential use. Id.; see also 
David Streitfeld, An Effort to Save a City by Shrinking It, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 2009, at 
A12 (discussing comparable efforts in Flint, Michigan).
25. Tobias Amborst et al., Improve Your Lot! in Cities Growing Smaller 33 
(2008). This trend developed in the 1990s despite the absence of any municipal mecha-
nism facilitating such purchases. See id. at 58-59; see also Thomas Gunton, Coping 
with the Spector of Urban Malaise in a Post Modern Landscape: The Need for a Detroit 
Land Bank Authority, 84 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 521 (2007) (discussing a land bank for 
the Detroit area that ultimately was approved in November 2006).
26. S.B. 353, 127th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2007).
27. Re-Imagining, supra note 18.
28. For an excellent history of the impact of questionable mortgage lending practices 
and their resulting waves of foreclosures, see Kermit J. Lind, The Perfect Storm: An 
Eyewitness Report from Ground Zero in Cleveland’s Neighborhoods, 17 J. Afford-
able Housing & Community. Dev. L. 237 (2008).
29. Alex Kotlowitz, All Boarded Up, N.Y. Times, March 8, 2009, § MM, at 28. (“The 
city estimates that 10,000 houses, or 1 in 13, are vacant. The county treasurer says it’s
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who foreclosed on the properties, by speculators who purchase fore-
closed properties in bulk, or (increasingly) by defaulting owners when 
the lender declines to take the property, deeming it a liability more than 
an asset. 30 Vacant and abandoned buildings attract crime, pose a fi re 
hazard, and reduce the value of surrounding properties. 31 They signal 
that a neighborhood is on the decline. 32 The land bank offers a mecha-
nism to take public control of distressed properties and direct them to an 
appropriate use; the Re-Imagining report envisions new, non-residential 
uses for excess properties. 
 A. The Cuyahoga County Land Bank 
 In general, a land bank is a governmental entity that takes title to tax-
delinquent property, secures the property and perhaps demolishes struc-
tures on it, and transfers the property back to private ownership with 
a clear title, to ensure that the property can be put to productive (and 
tax-paying) use. 33 Land banking is not new to Cleveland. The city’s 
more likely 15,000.”) Cleveland is not alone in its plight; the foreclosure crisis and 
economic decline in some central cities has prompted national concern, as evidenced by 
the work of the National Vacant Properties Campaign, which asserts that “according the 
Brookings Institution, Vacant and abandoned properties occupy about 15 percent of the 
area of the typical large city, more than 12,000 acres on average.” National Vacant Prop-
erties Campaign, Smart Growth, http://www.vacantproperties.org/issues/smartgrowth.
html (last visited Mar. 10, 2010); see also John Landis, The Shape of the New American 
City: Part Three: The Metropolitan Footprint: Sprawl and Reurbanization: the Chang-
ing Shape of Metropolitan America, 626 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 154, 
166 (2009) (tracking Census Bureau data to show that, overall, metropolitan areas in 
the United States are growing, but that ten of the fi fty largest core cities lost population 
between 1990 and 2007; “[t]he biggest percentage losers (Detroit, St. Louis, Cleveland, 
and Baltimore) were also the biggest absolute losers.”).
30. Kotlowitz, supra note 29; see also Lind, supra note 28, at 238-40 (describing the 
history of Cleveland).
31. See, e.g., Thomas Fitzpatrick, Understanding Ohio’s Land Bank Legis-
lation 1 (2009), http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/PolicyDis/pdp25.pdf; Creola 
Johnson, Symposium Subprime Meltdown: The Law and Finance of the American Home 
Mortgage Foreclosure Crisis: Fight Blight: Cities Sue to Hold Lenders Responsible for 
the Rise in Foreclosures and Abandoned Properties, 2008 Utah L. Rev. 1169, 1181-84 
(2008) (documenting the impact of vacant housing with examples from Cleveland, 
St. Louis, Detroit, and Philadelphia, as well as data gathered by the National League of 
Cities and National Fire Protection Agency); David T. Kraut, Hanging Out the No Va-
cancy Sign: Eliminating the Blight of Vacant Buildings from Urban Areas, 74 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 1139 (1999).
32. Fitzpatrick, supra note 31.
33. Matthew J. Samsa, Reclaiming Abandoned Properties: Using Public Nuisance 
Suits and Land Banks to Pursue Economic Redevelopment, 56 Clev. St. L. Rev. 189, 
213-14 (2008). Other cities that have established land banks include St. Louis, Louis-
ville, Atlanta, and the City of Flint and Genesee County in Michigan. Frank S. Alexan-
der, Land Bank Strategies for Renewing Urban Land, 14 J. Affordable Housing & 
Community Dev. L. 140, 146 (2005); see, e.g., Genesee County Land Bank, http://
thelandbank.org (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
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own land bank was created in the 1970s during the city’s fi rst round 
of serious deterioration. 34 At that time, the city had more than 11,000 
tax delinquent parcels and the city responded by persuading Ohio to 
adopt laws authorizing a land bank for such properties. 35 “Thousands of 
abandoned parcels fl owed into the land bank to be administered by the 
city’s Community Development Department. [C]heap properties with 
cleared, marketable titles” 36 were made available through the land bank 
to foster redevelopment. 37 
 In recent years, some infl uential public fi gures in Cuyahoga County, 
in which Cleveland is located, concluded that the city’s own land bank 
had some serious shortcomings in addressing the foreclosure crisis 
that began in 2000. 38 The original Cleveland land bank was adopted 
under legislation that authorized a passive land bank program. 39 When 
the city foreclosed on a tax-delinquent property, the property would be 
advertised and offered for sale; 40 if not purchased after two auctions, 
the land bank could receive the property for management and resale. 41 
This mechanism allowed speculators to purchase property at auction, 
preventing it from reaching the land bank. As the city continued to de-
teriorate from 2000-2009, hundreds of properties went into the hands 
of absentee owners who failed to maintain the properties and allowed 
them to continue to deteriorate. 42 Moreover, the land bank tended to ac-
quire only unimproved land, in order to avoid the costs associated with 
demolishing vacant buildings. 43 
34. Alexander, supra note 33.
35. Id. at 147.
36. Norman Krumholz, Land Banking and Neighborhood Revitalization in Cleve-
land, Planners’ Casebook, American Institute of Certified Planners (2002), 
reprinted in David L. Callies, Robert H. Freilich & Thomas E. Roberts, Cases 
and Materials on Land Use 641 (5th ed. 2008).
37. Id. at 641-42.
38. This group included the Cuyahoga County Treasurer, James Rokakis, and sev-
eral state legislators. Cuyahoga Land Bank, About the Land Bank, http;//www.cuya
hogalandbank.org/about.php (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
39. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5722.06 (LexisNexis 2010); see Cleveland, Ohio, 
Codified Ordinances tit. XV, ch. 183.021 (2009).
40. Ohio Rev. Code. Ann. §§ 5721.18-19, 5722.03-06 (LexisNexis 2010); see Keri 
Blackwell, Model Practices in Tax Foreclosure & Property Disposition: 
Cleveland Case Study (2003), http:www.lisc.org/content/publications/detail/797.
41. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5722.03 (LexisNexis 2010); Fitzpatrick, supra 
note 31.
42. See Kotlowitz, supra note 29; Fitzpatrick, supra note 31, at 3-4.
43. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5722.01(F) (LexisNexis 2010); see also § 5722.03 
(no statutory authority for acquisition from lenders); Fitzpatrick, supra note 31, at 
3-4 (discussing how banks only take unimproved land); Blackwell, supra note 40 
(describing Cleveland’s tax foreclosure acquisition system).
232 The Urban Lawyer  Vol. 42, No. 2  Spring 2010
 In January 2009, the Ohio legislature adopted a measure to authorize 
a new form of active, county-wide land bank in Cuyahoga County. 44 By 
virtue of its county-wide scope, this land bank would include not only 
the city of Cleveland but also the relatively prosperous adjacent suburbs 
within the county. 45 The county land bank would operate as a distinct 
legal entity 46 with its own sources of funding, 47 empowered to acquire 
tax-delinquent properties directly without the intervening step of the pub-
lic auction. 48 In addition, the county land bank would be able to negotiate 
with lenders to acquire bank-owned foreclosed properties, acquire prop-
erty as a gift, or purchase properties from individuals. 49 Because some of 
the properties would be in the suburbs outside Cleveland, they would be 
more likely to have value and offer a source of income upon sale. The 
county land bank could decide whether a building on the property was 
best rehabilitated or demolished. It would be able to bundle clusters of 
properties as needed to make them more attractive for development. 50 
 The county’s land bank is in its infancy, 51 and is working out its re-
lationship with the cities within the county, 52 so at this point it cannot 
be known whether it will live up to its promise. 53 The county land bank 
works with the pre-existing Cleveland City land bank to determine the 
44. § 1724.04.
45. § 1724.10 (land bank as agent of the county). Cuyahoga County encompasses 
not only the City of Cleveland, but a wide range of adjacent suburbs including Shaker 
Heights, Cleveland Heights, Lakewood, and others. See Map of Communities— 
Cuyahoga County Board of County Commissioners, http://bocc.cuyahogacounty.us/en-
US/map-communities.aspx (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
46. §§ 1724.04, 5722.02(B).
47. §§ 1724.02(A), (C), (H), 321.341, .261(A), 307.698, 5705.19(EE), (UU).
48. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 323.78, 1724.02 (LexisNexis 2010).
49. § 1724.02.
50. § 1724.01(B), .02; see also Strategic Land Assembly: Cuyahoga County Ohio 
Land Bank, http://www.cuyahogalandbank.org/land_assembly.php (discussing strate-
gic land assembly by the land bank); Fitzpatrick, supra note 31, at 5-6.
51. The bank was incorporated on April 9, 2009, and named the Cuyahoga County 
Land Bank. Cuyahoga County Resolution (Apr. 16, 2009), available at http://www.
cuyahogalandbank.org/documents/organizational/Res_091413_Certifi ed_Incorp_of_
CLRC.pdf
52. By law, any city within the county may reach an agreement concerning property 
that fl ows into the bank, setting general policies and practices for how properties shall 
be handled. See § 5722.02(D). For certain properties, any city within the county has a 
thirty day “priority right of acquisition” over property that is placed in the county bank. 
Id. The Land Bank’s web site notes: “The CCLRC has many options for what to do with 
property it acquires, but each Cuyahoga County city is a major partner in the decision 
regarding what will be done with properties that lie within its own jurisdiction,” Cuya-
hoga Land Bank, supra note 38.
53. Already it has been applauded as a “national model,” and the Ohio legislature 
is considering authorizing land banks like it in other areas of the state. Cuyahoga Land 
Bank, Cuyahoga County Land Reutilization Legislation Called “National Model” (Dec. 4, 
2009), http://www.cuyahogalandbank.org/articles/20091204_clrc_national_model.php.
Urban Agriculture 233
fate of properties within that city. 54 If, however, the two land banks con-
trol a signifi cant quantity of vacant land in Cleveland, they can be a 
source of publicly owned land to be kept in public hands or turned over 
to private entities, for use as envisioned in the  Re-Imagining report, 
described below. 55 
 B. Re-Imagining a More Sustainable Cleveland 
 Over the past decade, it has become apparent that Cleveland and cit-
ies like it are unlikely to return to their industrial past; they must fi nd 
new ways to move forward, and take advantage of opportunities for 
innovation.  Re-Imagining a More Sustainable Cleveland is the city’s 
fi rst major step in that new direction, outlining new strategies for using 
vacant or under-utilized land. 56 While  Re-Imagining emphasizes green 
infrastructure (such as ecosystem restoration, remediation, and green 
space) and productive landscapes (agriculture and alternative energy 
such as geothermal and wind turbine power), it is important to acknowl-
edge that the Cleveland City Plan addresses both growth and shrinkage: 
the city seeks to attract new development and to foster local engines of 
economic growth where possible, focusing on areas of the city where 
growth is most promising. At the same time the city recognizes that its 
54. § 5722(D). As noted on the Land Bank’s web site, “the City of Cleveland oper-
ates its own land bank and will take title to all vacant land produced by CCLRC demoli-
tions within its city limits.” Cuyahoga Land Bank, supra note 38. Cleveland’s land bank 
is located within the Community Development department. City of Cleveland Ohio, Di-
vision of Real Estate, http://www.city.cleveland.oh.us/CityofCleveland/Home/Govern
ment/CityAgencies/CommunityDevelopment/LandBank (last visited Mar. 30, 2010).
55. The Land Bank specifi cally supports urban agriculture:
The CCLRC will seek to partner with public and private sector organizations to 
use the CCLRC’s inventory to support urban agriculture. The CCLRC will assist 
community groups wishing to develop and maintain gardens in targeted areas. The 
gardens can be a part of a broader water retention or beautifi cation initiative, or a 
food distribution network. Parameters will be provided to guide development.
Cuyahoga Land Bank, Demolition and Vacant Lot Re-Use, http://www.cuyahoga
landbank.org/demo_vacant_reuse.php (last visited Mar. 30, 2010). See generally Samsa, 
supra note 33 (discussing the characteristics and value of land banking in community 
revitalization).
56. Re-Imagining was the result of a one year planning process, in which the co-
operating institutions “explored strategies for reuse of vacant land with the goal of 
making Cleveland a cleaner, healthier, more beautiful, and economically sound city.” 
Re-Imagining, supra note 18, at 1. The thirty member working group focused on iden-
tifying goals and strategies, policy changes that might be necessary, and opportuni-
ties for pilot projects to test its principles. Id. The coalition that prepared the report 
consisted of the Cleveland City Planning Commission, the Cleveland Land Lab at the 
Cleveland Urban Design Collaborative of Kent State University, and a nonprofi t organi-
zation, Neighborhood Progress, Inc, with fi nancial support from the Surdna Foundation. 
Id. During the summer of 2009, Neighborhood Progress, Inc., funded pilot projects to 
investigate some of the strategies identifi ed in Re-Imagining. Neighborhood Progress, 
Key Initiatives, http://neighborhoodprogress.org (last visited Mar. 30, 2010).
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long-term health is threatened by vacant and abandoned properties that 
are not located in pathways of development, and that new uses for these 
properties must be found. 57 
 Consistent with this two-pronged growing and shrinking strategy, 
 Re-Imagining presents a decision tree for individual vacant sites in the 
city. This decision tree, endorsed by the Cleveland City Planning Com-
mission and designed to guide disposition of property in the city’s own 
land bank, 58 shows how the city envisions allocating property between 
green and traditional developmental uses. The city might select ecologi-
cally valuable or sensitive properties for preservation through a variety 
of uses: alternative energy generation, storm water management (such 
as through bio-retention or as a constructed wetland), green space, re-
mediation through bioremediation, phytoremediation, or mycoremedia-
tion, or urban agriculture. 59 Other properties are assessed to determine 
their long-term development potential. Areas with strong development 
potential might be designated for a holding strategy: landscaping or bio-
remediation. For areas with weak development potential,  Re-Imagining 
identifi es the following menu of possible treatments: 
 • Community garden 
 • Bioremediation, phytoremediation, mycoremediation 
 • Constructed wetland 
 • Deep tillage/pavement removal 
 • Basic greening techniques 
 • Solar fi eld 
 • Urban agriculture/commodity farming 
 • Storm water management: riparian setbacks, stream daylighting. 60 
 Although this decision tree formally relates only to sites already in 
the city’s possession (properties that have found their way into the city’s 
land bank of vacant sites), 61 it shows how the  Re-Imagining proposal 
considers a broad array of uses for excess property in Cleveland. 
57. See Cleveland City Plan, http://planning.city.cleveland.oh.us (last visited Mar. 10, 
2010).
58. Re-Imagining, supra note 18, at 9 fi g.7. The city land bank is located in the 
Community Development Department but land will not be released from the land bank 
without approval from the Cleveland City Council. City of Cleveland, supra note 56.
59. Re-Imagining, supra note 18, at 9 fi g.7. Each of the remediation techniques is 
a way to use natural processes to clean up mildly contaminated sites. Bio-remediation 
uses microbes in soil and groundwater; phytoremediation and mycoremediation work 
in the same way, using plants and fungi. Id. at 24.
60. Id. at 9 fi g.7.
61. Id. The Re-Imagining report was completed before the county land bank became 
operational. The county land bank specifi cally endorses urban agriculture as a desirable 
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 Re-Imagining makes clear that its goal is to put all land in Cleveland 
to some form of benefi cial use; the innovation in the document is its 
broad defi nition of what constitutes benefi cial. As the report explains: 
 Given the large and growing inventory of vacant properties in the City of Cleveland, 
it is unlikely that all of the city’s surplus land will be reused for conventional real 
estate development in the foreseeable future. The alternative land use strategies de-
scribed in this document are intended to put vacant properties to productive use in 
ways that complement the city’s long-term development objectives. 62 
 Thus the report includes urban agriculture, green space, green energy, 
and ecosystem restoration as benefi cial land uses. It lists the following 
goals: 
 •  Productive use/public benefi t . Whether vacant properties are devel-
oped with buildings and infrastructure, preserved as open space, or 
put into productive use as agriculture or energy generation sites, 
they should provide an economic return, a community benefi t, and/
or an enhancement to natural ecosystems. 
 •  Ecosystem function . Stormwater management, soil restoration, air 
quality, carbon sequestration, urban heat island effects, biodiver-
sity and wildlife habitat should be incorporated into future plans 
for vacant sites in the city. 
 •  Remediation . Remove the risk to human health and the environment 
from environmental pollutants at vacant sites, either with targeted 
remediation projects or with long-term incremental strategies. 63 
 Re-Imagining is a vision document; it does not include specifi c pro-
posals for particular properties. 64 At the end of the document are lists of 
recommendations and proposals for further action. At the top of the list: 
“Establish a task force to assess and address barriers to new vacant land 
reutilization strategies, including zoning, building, and health codes, 
access to city land and water, etc.” 65 
 C. The Urban Garden or Urban Agriculture District 
 In  Re-Imagining , Cleveland joins a small but growing number of shrink-
ing cities focusing on green uses as a new way forward. Youngstown, 
Ohio has adopted a plan to use its vacant properties for green uses, 
use for land that it acquires. Cuyahoga Land Bank, Demolition and Vacant Lot Re-Use, 
supra note 55.
62. Re-Imagining, supra note 18, at 5.
63. Id.
64. While no specifi c plans or ordinances have followed, grants for pilot projects 
were awarded in Summer 2009 and most of those projects will begin in Summer 2010.
65. Re-Imagining, supra note 18, at 31.
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including a new use category of urban agriculture. 66 Urban agriculture 
also is making headway in Detroit, where local entrepreneurs working 
with Michigan State University have announced plans to establish “the 
world’s largest urban farm.” 67 Cleveland has taken the unusual step of 
adopting a specifi c zoning category for urban gardens. 68 
 One green use already included in Cleveland’s zoning code is a spe-
cifi c use category, the Urban Garden District. The Cleveland Zoning 
Code explains the rationale for the district: 
 [T]o ensure that urban garden areas are appropriately located and protected to meet 
needs for local food production, community health, community education, garden-
related job training, environmental enhancement, preservation of green space, and 
community enjoyment on sites for which urban gardens represent the highest and 
best use for the community. 69 
 Thus the city’s goals in fostering urban gardens are two-fold: garden-
ing is by itself a productive use of land, and in addition the city is con-
cerned about inner city “food deserts” 70 that contribute to poor nutrition 
in many areas of the city. 71 The city seeks to ensure that urban gardens 
are established as a goal in themselves, not as a holding strategy until it 
is time for residential or commercial building construction. 72 
 Cleveland’s urban garden district encompasses both community gardens 
and market gardens. A community garden is not a commercial enterprise: 
it is “an area of land managed and maintained by a group of individuals . . . 
for personal or group use, consumption or donation.” 73 A market garden 
66. Finnerty, supra note 20, at 47.
67. Hantz Farms Detroit, Introducing Hantz Farms, http://www.hantzfarmsdetroit.
com/introduction.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2010).
68. For a description of urban agriculture zones in the small group of cities that have 
taken this step, see Mukherji & Morales, “Zoning for Urban Agriculture,” Zoning Prac-
tice (March 2010) (American Planning Ass’n).
69. Cleveland, Ohio, Codified Ordinances tit. VII, ch. 336.01 (2009).
70. “[P]laces where fast food restaurants are prevalent and grocery stores are few,” 
Re-Imagining, supra note 18, at 26.
71. Id. at 27 fi g.25 (map of food deserts and community gardens).
72. Id. at 26-29. The City’s Planning Director informally offers the following ex-
planation:
The principal purpose of the Urban Garden zoning district is to legislatively reserve 
certain land for urban gardening, with the necessity for legislation and public notice 
mailed to nearby property owners—which is required in zoning legislation—if an 
urban garden property were to be made available for another use. . . . A second reason 
for the Urban Garden zoning is that it is a little more permissive than is our Residen-
tial zoning in permitting fencing that may be needed for an urban garden and in allow-
ing the on-site sale of plantings that are grown on the site (i.e., a “market garden”).
E-mail from Robert N. Brown, Director, Cleveland Planning Commission (Oct. 3, 
2009) (on fi le with author).
73. Cleveland, Ohio, Codified Ordinances tit. VII, ch. 336.02(a) (2009).
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is “an area of land managed and maintained by an individual or group 
of individuals to grow and harvest . . . crops . . . to be sold for profi t.” 74 
These two garden uses are the only uses allowed in the Cleveland urban 
garden district, but the zoning category allows for either type of garden. 
Cleveland currently does not have distinct language for urban commercial 
agriculture, but this designation does not appear necessary because it ap-
pears that urban agriculture, which tends to be small-scale cultivation of 
high value crops, fi ts within the defi nition of a market garden. 
 The uses allowed in the urban garden district are restricted to garden-
ing (with accessory uses such as open space and appropriate signs), 
with or without on-site sale of crops. 75 No structures are allowed in 
the urban garden district, except for small structures associated with 
the permitted uses, such as greenhouses, tool-sheds, shade pavilions, or 
“rest-room facilities with composting toilets.” 76 
 At this point, a threshold issue must be addressed: why would a city 
bother to rezone land for an urban garden? As a practical matter, gar-
dening is permissible in any zoning district; a homeowner does not need 
zoning permission, for example, in order to raise vegetables. 
 As its statement of purpose demonstrates, 77 the city sees a distinctive 
role for the urban garden district.  Re-Imagining envisions urban garden 
uses as a desirable end in themselves, not just as an interim use while 
the city waits for further development; 78 the district helps to protect 
the use and foster the urban garden network. A formal zoning designa-
tion reserves particular land for urban gardening; the zoning cannot be 
changed without re-zoning the property through the standard zoning 
legislative process, including notice to neighbors and a public hearing. 
Thus the urban garden district is a public and transparent embodiment 
of a city policy in favor of such uses. In addition, the urban garden dis-
trict specifi cally allows uses of particular importance to urban garden-
ing, including “seasonal farm stands” selling produce—not a use that 
would be allowed in a residential district—as well as other amenities 
such as restroom facilities and fences up to six feet high. 79 Possible pri-
vate owners of land in the urban garden district include local nonprofi t 
organizations that foster community gardening for civic or educational 
purposes, or a for-profi t urban farmer. 
74. Id. ch. 336.02(b)
75. Id. chs. 336.03, .04(b)—(c).
76. Id. ch. 336.04(e).
77. Id. ch. 336.01.
78. Re-Imagining, supra note 18, at 9.
79. Id. chs. 336.04, .05.
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 II.  Can the Land Use Regulatory System be Used for 
Managed Shrinkage? 
 The history of land use law in this country shows that its predominant 
focus has been on development and the management of development. 80 
Most of our modern land use structure is designed around this concern. 81 
The use of this same regulatory structure to manage shrinkage and de-
urbanization, rather than growth and urbanization, runs contrary to this 
practice, yet the history of the development and adaptation of our land 
use regulatory tools shows that they are available for the task. 82 One ex-
ample in this history stands out: the local innovations that led to growth 
management programs in some communities in the 1960s and 1970s. 83 
The growth management story shows how communities can use existing 
land use regulatory tools in creative ways to address new challenges. 
 A. A (Very) Brief History of Land Use Law 
 Land use regulation has been with us for centuries, as governments seek 
to ensure that the public interest is protected against consequences of 
disorder and congestion. Early edicts in Elizabethan England focused 
on overcrowding: rapid growth in London prompted Parliament to 
adopt measures to mitigate the adverse effects on the public welfare 
of a “great multitude of people brought to inhabit in small rooms . . . 
smothered with many families of children and servants in one house 
or small tenement,” raising concerns about adequate food supplies and 
transmission of plague. 84 This heritage of land use control came to the 
colonies with the English settlers and included measures designed to 
require the development of property and discourage leaving it in the 
natural state. 85 In urban areas, colonial governments were concerned 
about undue density. 86 
 Today, land use regulation—and particularly zoning 87 —is a core 
function of local government, in accordance with the authority granted 
80. E.g., Juergensmeyer & Roberts, supra note 1, at 18-22 (history of land use 
law focused on addressing the challenges of urban growth).
81. See infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
83. See infra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
84. David L. Callies et al., Cases and Materials on Land Use 2-3 n.** (5th ed. 
2008) (quoting 31 Eliz. I C. 7 (6 Stat. 409 et seq.)).
85. John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Signifi cance for Modern Takings 
Doctrine, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1252, 1259-72, 1276-80 (1996).
86. Id. at 1273-74.
87. The standard land use regulatory tools include zoning, planning, subdivision re-
view, and fi nancing infrastructure; these are the core elements found in any treatise on 
the subject. See, e.g., Mandelker, supra note 1, at 3.01.
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to it by the relevant state. 88 The concept of zoning began to take hold 
early in the twentieth century, culminating in the drafting of the Stan-
dard Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA) by the United States Department of 
Commerce in 1924. 89 Section 1 of the SZEA identifi ed the regulation 
of both population density and building intensity as key elements of the 
zoning power. 90 Section 3 of the SZEA makes clear that the purposes 
of zoning include reducing traffi c congestion, and preventing the “over-
crowding of land” and “undue concentration of population.” 91 
 To some extent these provisions refl ect the origin of the SZEA, which 
was based on the zoning law developed for New York City (hence the 
concern with congestion and “adequate light and air”), 92 but they go far 
beyond a concern with overcrowding to express a concern more gener-
ally with “health and the general welfare.” 93 
 These two sections together comprise the key elements of the SZEA, 
offering local governments a specifi c regulatory tool—the power to 
zone—with relatively broad permission to exercise their discretion in 
the public interest. Thus the zoning power is delegated to local gov-
ernments as a specifi c tool by which to exercise the police power: the 
traditional power of governments to protect their citizens’ health, safety 
and general welfare. This police power is an inherent power of the state 
legislature that it delegates to local government, and the scope of the 
zoning power thus depends upon the scope of the police power under 
state law. 94 
88. In the United States, all local government powers derive from the state. Thus any 
local government activity must be authorized by the state constitution or state legisla-
ture, or must be reasonably necessary to achieve that authorized activity. See Hunter v. 
City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907); e.g., Barlow Burke, Understanding 
the Law of Zoning and Land Use Controls 6-7 (2d ed. 2009).
89. See Advisory Committee on Zoning, A Standard State Zoning Enabling 
Act (rev. ed. 1928), available at http://myapa.planning.org/growingsmart/pdf/SZ
EnablingAct1926.pdf. This legislation was adopted in some form by virtually all states 
in the United States, so that although zoning is a matter of state and local law its form 
is very similar nationwide. Mandelker, supra note 1, at 4.15.
90. Specifi cally, section 1 identifi ed the following grants of power:
To regulate and restrict the height, number of stories, and size of buildings and 
other structures, the percentage of lot that may be occupied, the size of yards, courts 
and other open spaces, the density of population, the location and use of buildings, 
structures, and land for trade, industry, residence, or other purposes.
Standard State Zoning Enabling Act § 1, reprinted in Mandelker, supra note 1, at 
4.16.




94. See Burke, supra note 88, at 3-5 (explaining the origin and scope of the police 
power and its role in local land use authority).
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 The constitutionality of zoning was upheld by the Supreme Court in 
 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co . 95 in 1926. The Village of Euclid 
was, at the time, an existing village near rapidly-growing Cleveland, 
Ohio. In the absence of municipal borders or zoning, it was likely that 
most, if not all of the land owned by Ambler Realty in Euclid would 
be developed for industry. 96 “The Village of Euclid decided, however, 
that it wanted to determine the land uses within its boundaries. It ad-
opted zoning for the entire village and in so doing zoned a portion of 
Ambler’s land for residential use. 97 Ambler raised a facial challenge to 
the very concept of zoning, asserting that the village could not justify 
its disruption of the natural forces of the market. The Supreme Court 
rejected Ambler’s challenge and in so doing established several points 
of essential importance to the development of land use law, the follow-
ing of which are pertinent here. 
 First, the  Euclid decision endorsed the concept of zoning. That is, the 
Supreme Court agreed that a local government constitutionally could 
decide what land uses would be permitted within its borders by means 
of defi ning those uses and identifying their permissible locations on a 
map. In that effort, the village could exercise its own judgment on be-
half of the health, safety and welfare of its residents; it did not need to 
consider the uses in neighboring Cleveland. 98 
 Second, the  Euclid decision endorsed a principle of deferential re-
view of local land use legislative decisions. The process of adopting 
a zoning ordinance and map is a legislative decision by the legislative 
body of a municipal government. Key words in the decision are now fa-
miliar in judicial review of land use legislative decisions: “If the validity 
of the legislative classifi cation for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, 
the legislative judgment must be allowed to control.” 99 
 Third,  Euclid tells us that a zoning restriction can be valid even if 
it reduces the value of an individual parcel of land. Ambler asserted 
that his land had lost seventy-fi ve percent of its value through the re-
strictive zoning; 100 the Court did not fi nd this to be a legal fl aw. The 
opinion offers no suggestion that Ambler deserves to be compensated 
for the reduction in value of his property (in part because the Court 
 95. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
 96. See id. at 384.
 97. Id. at 379-80, 382.
 98. Id. at 389-90.
 99. Id. at 388.
100. See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 384.
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handled this case as a facial attack to the zoning ordinance itself, 101 
not as a challenge to the effect of the zoning as applied to Ambler’s 
land). 102 
 After  Euclid , the concept of zoning was protected from federal con-
stitutional attack and the practice of zoning spread nationwide. Also 
over the years, the scope and detail of land use regulation expanded to 
include mandates for planning (based to some extent on the Standard 
City Planning Enabling Act drafted in 1928), 103 detailed controls over 
the construction of subdivisions (also based in part on the Standard City 
Planning Enabling Act of 1928), 104 and an array of other land use regu-
latory tools. Use of each of these tools was predominantly focused on 
ensuring that development of land takes place in a manner that protects 
the public interest. Cities channel growth, limit density, and dictate aes-
thetic features of what is developed; in general, communities expect that 
growth will happen and that it is their goal to manage it. 
 B. Growth Management Innovations 
 Although much of the land use regulatory system is about eighty-years-
old, it has proven to be both durable and adaptable, as municipalities 
use the regulatory tools at their disposal to address emerging issues of 
the day. The history of growth management regulation provides a perti-
nent example. From its inception, zoning was used to shape the land use 
structure of a municipality, but it was not designed to affect or constrain 
the pace of development. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, municipali-
ties in rapidly-growing areas of the nation became concerned that their 
populations were growing too quickly for their tastes, threatening their 
ability to provide adequate public services and maintain an acceptable 
quality of life for their residents. Two of these municipalities in par-
ticular undertook to devise regulatory mechanisms to control growth, 
prompting litigation that resulted in two important decisions:  Golden v. 
101. Id. at 386.
102. The Court specifi cally noted that, in a particular instance, a zoning designation 
might be unconstitutional as applied to a particular parcel of land, 272 U.S. at 395, and 
a few years later it found such an instance of unconstitutionality in Nectow v. City of 
Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
103. See Burke, supra note 88, at 76.
104. Mandelker observes: “States fi rst enacted subdivision control legislation to-
wards the close of the nineteenth century to remedy land conveyancing problems. . . . 
The Standard City Planning Enabling Act used these early subdivision platting statutes 
as a model for subdivision control enabling legislation which was included in the Act.” 
Mandelker, supra note 1, at 9.02.
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Planning Board of Ramapo 105 and  Construction Industry Ass’n v. City 
of Petaluma . 106 
 The most signifi cant of these for present purposes was the  Ramapo 
decision. 107 In 1969, the Ramapo town board—concerned about rapid 
growth—amended its zoning ordinance to make ingenious use of the 
town’s existing powers of planning, zoning and subdivision regulation. 
The town prepared a comprehensive plan to determine what infrastructure 
it would need to accommodate future growth, how much the infrastruc-
ture would cost, and how it could all be built. 108 Then, on the basis of this 
information, Ramapo prepared a mechanism for phased development. 
 The town decided that construction of a residential subdivision on 
undeveloped land would be considered a “residential development use” 
for which a special use permit would be required. 109 The town adopted 
requirements for the special use permit, based on the availability of nec-
essary infrastructure. The use permit would not be granted until critical 
infrastructure was available: sewers, drainage, parks and schools, roads, 
and fi re stations. 110 Under the town’s capital improvement schedule, this 
could mean a wait of up to eighteen years. 111 
105. Golden v. Planning Bd., 285 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1972).
106. Constr. Indus. Ass’n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
424 U.S. 934 (1975).
107. Ramapo is a town near New York City. Between 1950 and 1968, Ramapo’s 
population grew by nearly 300%, and it looked like the trend would continue, involving 
substantial amounts of residential construction. Golden, 285 N.E.2d at 294 n.1; John R. 
Nolon, Golden and Its Emanations: The Surprising Origins of Smart Growth, 35 Urb. 
Law 15, 18 (2003).
108. Golden, 285 N.E.2d at 294-95 n.1, 366-67.
109. Id. at 295.
110. 
The standards for the issuance of special permits are framed in terms of the avail-
ability to the proposed subdivision plat of fi ve essential facilities or services: spe-
cifi cally (1) public sanitary sewers or approved substitutes; (2) drainage facilities; 
(3) improved public parks or recreation facilities, including public schools; (4) State, 
county or town roads-major, secondary or collector; and, (5) fi rehouses. No special 
permit shall issue unless the proposed residential development has accumulated 15 
development points, to be computed on a sliding scale of values assigned to the speci-
fi ed improvements under the statute. Subdivision is thus a function of immediate 
availability to the proposed plat of certain municipal improvements; the avowed pur-
pose of the amendments being to phase residential development to the Town’s ability 
to provide the above facilities or services.
Id. at 295.
111. A developer could advance the date of development by providing the infra-
structure itself, in order to achieve the necessary number of “development points.” 
A landowner also could build a residence on residential land that was not subdivided. 
Id. The town included some other fl exibility measures as well.
Certain savings and remedial provisions are designed to relieve of potentially un-
reasonable restrictions. Thus, the board may issue special permits vesting a present 
right to proceed with residential development in such year as the development meets 
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 Although the town’s growth management program used only its tra-
ditional tools of planning, zoning, and subdivision review, the purpose 
to which these tools were put and the precise details of the program 
were path-breaking. “The planning literature of the time was full of 
excitement about growth management, but there was little evidence, on 
the ground, of its legal adoption.” 112 
 The plaintiffs charged that Ramapo’s program was not authorized 
by the state enabling legislation. And that was a reasonable challenge: 
zoning authority, of which the special use permit is a part, is designed to 
shape development, not to slow it down. This issue had not previously 
been litigated. 113 The New York Court of Appeals agreed that there was 
no specifi c authority for this type of timing control in the zoning law. 114 
Zoning had not traditionally concerned itself with timing. 
 But the court looked beyond the zoning power to “the perimeters of 
the devices authorized and purposes sanctioned under current enabling 
legislation.” 115 The state conferred the zoning power in order to protect 
the public interest; this power “includes . . . by way of necessary impli-
cation, the authority to direct the growth of population for the purposes 
indicated, within the confi nes of the township.” 116 This is “a necessary 
concomitant to the municipalities’ recognized authority to determine 
the lines along which local development shall proceed, though it may 
divert it from its natural course.” 117 This decision refl ects a very fl exible 
view of state authorization. The court did not parse particular language 
in the state legislation delegating the zoning and subdivision powers. It 
the required point minimum, but in no event later than the fi nal year of the 18-year 
capital plan. The approved special use permit is fully assignable, and improvements 
scheduled for completion within one year from the date of an application are to be 
credited as though existing on the date of the application. A prospective developer 
may advance the date of subdivision approval by agreeing to provide those improve-
ments which will bring the proposed plat within the number of development points 
required by the amendments. And applications are authorized to the “Development 
Easement Acquisition Commission” for a reduction of the assessed valuation. Fi-
nally, upon application to the Town Board, the development point requirements may 
be varied should the board determine that such a variance or modifi cation is consis-
tent with the on-going development plan.
Id. at 296-99.
112. Nolan, supra note 107, at 19.
113. Id. at 18.
114. Golden, 285 N.E.2d at 296 (“A reading of the relevant statutory provisions 
reveals that there is no specifi c authorization for the ‘sequential’ and ‘timing’ controls 
adopted here.”).
115. Id. at 296.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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looked more broadly at the purpose of land use regulation. This, plus 
the court’s highly deferential approach to the town’s planning efforts 
and reliance on the town’s good faith in carrying out its plan, 118 paved 
the way for a decision in the town’s favor. 119 
 The  Ramapo decision has been hailed as one of the foundations of 
the smart growth movement and other inventive uses of the land use 
system. Professor Nolon notes, for example, that the court’s “broad in-
terpretation of local land use authority has become a clear trend among 
courts nationally and has fueled a great expansion of local invention to 
deal with the problems of sprawl, the provision of infrastructure, the 
costs of development, and, recently, the protection of natural resources 
and the environment.” 120 As a matter of doctrine, “the New York Court 
of Appeals held that the state legislature had delegated vast implied 
powers to municipalities to time growth, to achieve the most appro-
priate use of the land, and to invent the mechanisms for doing so.” 121 
Professor Nolon praises both the town and the case as follows: “The 
Town of Ramapo blazed a bright trail of invention in the late 1960s. The 
 Ramapo court sustained the town’s power to do so and, for thirty years, 
local governments have been ever bolder in developing smart growth 
solutions to their unique land use problems.” 122 
118. “[I]n passing of the validity of the ordinance on its face, we must assume not 
only the Town’s good faith, but its assiduous adherence to the program’s scheduled 
implementation.” Id. at 373 n.7.
119. The opinion also addressed other important issues the plaintiffs raised. The 
court concluded that the town’s plan left landowners with suffi cient promise of future 
development that the law did not constitute a regulatory taking. Id. at 380-81. The court 
expressed concern about the exclusionary nature of the scheme: by defi nition, some 
people who wanted to live in Ramapo could not. But the court concluded that this was 
a necessary component of a timed growth structure based on a comprehensive plan. It 
had a valid police power justifi cation. Although regional measures might be better, the 
issue in this case was simply whether the town had the authority to take the steps it did, 
and the court concluded that the authority was there. Id. at 376.
120. Nolon, supra note 107, at 24.
121. Id. at 25.
122. Id. at 62. In the last decade, the planning community headlines have been domi-
nated by the concepts of “smart growth” and “new urbanism.” While earlier growth 
control efforts focused on controlling the rate of growth and ensuring adequate infra-
structure to serve it, the Smart Growth movement advocated rethinking the forms of 
growth, focusing on adopting a metropolitan-area-wide vision and reducing residential 
sprawl. Smart growth involves integrating considerations of land use, housing, em-
ployment, transportation, and the environment, with a focus on long-term sustainable 
development. New urbanism, in particular, focuses on encouraging denser, pedestrian-
 friendly neighborhoods with a greater emphasis on mass transportation. In 2002, the 
American Planning Association released its mammoth Growing Smart Legislative 
Guidebook, a comprehensive guide with model statutes for states to use to revamp 
their land use enabling legislation. Meck, supra note 1. But the key to this movement, 
as always, is that it assumes that growth will happen; it is intend to foster the type of 
growth that seems desirable.
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 Like  Ramapo , the  Petaluma case,  Construction Industry Ass’n of 
Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma , is signifi cant for its endorsement 
of the breadth of a municipality’s discretion to control growth under the 
police power. Like Ramapo, Petaluma was and is a suburb of a growing 
city, in its case, San Francisco. Between 1964 and 1971, the commu-
nity’s population began to grow so rapidly that the city became con-
cerned. 123 The response to the problem was the “Petaluma Plan,” based 
on extensive research about housing patterns and trends. 124 The plan 
focused on controlling the tempo of growth and limiting the outward 
expansion of the city. 125 
 The Petaluma plaintiffs took their complaint to federal court, rather 
than state court, so they necessarily raised federal issues, all of them 
constitutional in nature. In particular, they argued that the plan was “ex-
clusionary,” in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 126 
 The Ninth Circuit agreed that any restriction on construction of new 
houses would exclude somebody, but that the restriction need only sur-
vive rational basis scrutiny: it would survive constitutional challenge if 
it was rationally related to a legitimate public interest. 127 And the court 
cited a series of Supreme Court decisions endorsing a broad interpreta-
tion of the powers of local government in land use regulation. 128 For ex-
ample, in  Berman v. Parker 129 the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to 
a sweeping urban renewal program in the District of Columbia, stating: 
 The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values it represents 
are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power 
of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as 
healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. 130 
 In light of this Supreme Court precedent and under the facts before 
it, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Petaluma had adequately demon-
strated that its regulation was a rational response to legitimate concerns 
about the effects of growth. “We conclude therefore that . . . the concept 
of the public welfare is suffi ciently broad to uphold Petaluma’s desire 
123. Constr. Indus. Ass’n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975).
124. Id. at 901.
125. The Plan capped residential development at 500 dwelling units per year, when 
constructed in units of fi ve residences or more. The Plan included a greenbelt around 
the city as a boundary for urban expansion and outlined procedures and criteria for 
award of the annual 500 development-unit permits. See id.
126. See id. at 906-07.
127. See id.
128. See Constr. Indus. Ass’n, 522 F.2d. at 906-07.
129. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
130. Id. at 33.
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to preserve its small town character, its open spaces and low density of 
population, and to grow at an orderly and deliberate pace.” 131 
 The  Petaluma decision is based on federal law and gives us no di-
rect insights into the permissible parameters of the zoning power under 
state law, but it does parallel  Ramapo with its broad and generous view 
of the scope of the police power, showing that this view pervades the 
law at both the federal and the state level. The  Ramapo and  Petaluma 
decisions together demonstrate a fl exible interpretation of the range of 
interests local governments may seek to protect, and they have been 
infl uential in legitimizing growth management programs. 132 
 C. The Message for Shrinking Cities 
 This brief history of the court treatment of growth control plans illus-
trates two points: fi rst, the land use regulatory system historically has 
been focused on fostering and guiding growth and development; and 
second, that the existing land use regulatory system provides fl exible 
tools for regulators.  Ramapo in particular offers a model: the town of 
Ramapo identifi ed a problem, researched its parameters, and used the 
regulatory tools at its disposal in a creative manner to fashion a re-
sponse. The town’s decision to slow the rate of growth, the court tells 
us, was valid under state law; it was not a “taking” nor was it unduly 
exclusionary under the circumstances. 
 Deference as established in  Euclid and endorsed by state and federal 
decisions thereafter means that cities can choose their own view of how 
to regulate in the public interest, and they can use the regulatory tools 
they have to implement that view. Thus while the shrinking cities move-
ment represents a sharp change in direction, the land use regulatory 
system is fl exible enough to allow the shift. 
 Of particular importance here, perhaps, is the Supreme Court’s lan-
guage in  Berman v. Parker: the “concept of the public welfare is broad 
and inclusive.” 133  Berman upheld an ambitious urban renewal program 
that required razing an entire blighted neighborhood, even though the 
plaintiff’s property was itself not blighted. The general power to regu-
late in the public interest justifi ed this sweeping approach. The Court 
also noted the threat to the public interest of a decaying urban environ-
ment: “Miserable and disreputable housing conditions may do more 
than spread disease and crime and immorality. They may also suffocate 
131. Constr. Indus. Ass’n, 522 F.2d at 908-09.
132. See Daniel P. Selmi, et al., Land Use Regulation: Cases and Materials 
550 (3d ed. 2008).
133. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
Urban Agriculture 247
the spirit . . . [and also] may despoil a community as an open sewer may 
ruin a river.” 134 The Supreme Court’s views have carried over to state 
courts, which have upheld a municipality’s ability to determine what 
the public interest requires in a particular instance. 135 Thus if a city de-
cides that its interest lies in shrinking, not growing, and in “greening,” 
not building, there is ample precedent to suggest that its decision is well 
within its authority under the police power. 
 III. Challenges for the Shrinking City 
 Underlying the shrinking cities movement is a central insight: there is 
more land within some cities’ boundaries than current populations can 
use. Excess houses fall vacant and deteriorate; a surplus of vacant houses 
on the market sends a message of decay and drives down prices. For the 
foreseeable future,  Re-Imagining offers the view that the best way to 
handle both problems is to take land out of the development market and 
put it into alternative, productive “green” uses. As a practical matter, 
this might require rezoning land from its current category (residential, 
commercial, or industrial) into another development-restricted use. As 
noted earlier, Cleveland already has a zoning category for urban gar-
dens. 136 Such downzoning raises the perennial issue of the regulatory 
taking, which is the major focus of this section. This section also briefl y 
addresses some affi liated land use law objections to downzoning urban 
property and, on a different note, the mismatch between federal and 
state brownfi elds programs and the needs of a shrinking city. 137 
 A. The Regulatory Takings Challenge 
 In spite of its stated enthusiasm for low-intensity green uses, the Cleve-
land City Planning Commission is wary of taking any action that might 
134. Id.
135. See, e.g., Jaylin Inv., Inc. v. Vill. of Moreland Hills, 839 N.E.2d 903 (Ohio 
2005) (holding that exercise of zoning powers is presumed to be within a municipality’s 
police power unless it is arbitrary). This trend was visible even at the time of Euclid, 
which cited a “constantly increasing tendency in the direction of the broader view” of 
the power to zone in the public interest. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 
365, 390-91 (1926).
136. Urban gardens are discussed below. Cleveland recently adopted regulations for 
keeping bees, chickens, rabbits and other farm animals within city limits, Cleveland, 
Ohio, Codified Ordinances tit. VII, ch. 347.02 (2009), as well as zoning require-
ments for wind turbines. ch. 354A.
137. An interesting policy issue also arises, though at this point it does not have 
a distinctive legal parameter, and that is the relationship between the shrinking city 
concept—as implemented in the City of Cleveland itself—and another modern trend: 
an interest in regional governmental cooperation.
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give rise to a takings claim. The city’s planning director has posed the 
issue squarely: 
 With respect to zoning private land in the Urban Garden District, we would typically 
avoid private land unless the owner agrees to the zoning. . . .[If] a private owner 
objects to the urban garden zoning, I believe that it would be diffi cult for the City 
to justify using the Urban Garden zoning, because this action could be considered 
a regulatory taking of the property by removing most of the opportunity for an eco-
nomic return on the use of the property. 138 
 The  Re-Imagining proposal includes a signifi cant emphasis on urban 
gardens and ecologically-valuable green space; consequently the tak-
ings question deserves careful attention. In that regard, urban gardens 
and urban agriculture pose issues distinct from preservation of green 
space for ecological functions. 
 While property law always has allowed some restrictions on land 
use 139 —mere ownership of a piece of land does not entitle a person to 
do with it whatever he wants—at the same time the courts have recog-
nized federal constitutional limits (and in many states additional state 
constitutional limits) 140 on the extent to which the government can con-
strain private land use without providing compensation. 141 In theory, the 
issue is not whether regulation is unlawful; it is whether the government 
must pay for the interference it causes. In practical effect, however, 
cash-strapped public entities will seek to avoid imposing restrictions 
that carry with them the hefty price tags of litigation and possible com-
pensation. Thus it is essential to determine whether downzoning private 
urban property to an urban garden or urban agricultural designation 
might constitute a taking. 142 
138. E-mail from Robert N. Brown, supra note 72.
139. E.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992) (“It 
seems to us that the property owner necessarily expects the uses of his property to be 
restricted, from time to time, by various measures newly enacted by the State in legiti-
mate exercise of its police powers.”); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 
413 (1922) (“As long recognized some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation 
and must yield to the police power.”); Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 
176 (1915)
Granting that it is not a nuisance per se, it is clearly within the police power of the 
state to regulate the business, and . . . to declare that in particular circumstances and 
in particular localities a livery stable shall be deemed a nuisance in fact and in law, 
provided this power is not exerted arbitrarily, or with unjust discrimination.
Id.
140. This article focuses on federal issues alone.
141. For an interesting discussion of the meaning of private land ownership and how 
it affects takings law, see Eric T. Freyfogle, Private Property: Correcting the Half Truths, 
59 Plan. & Envtl L. 3 (2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1075702.
142. The takings case law is founded on the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, 
applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, which tells us that private 
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 As early as 1922, the Supreme Court held that “[g]overnment hardly 
could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be 
diminished without paying for every such change in the general law,” 143 
but “if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.” 144 We 
must not forget that “a strong public desire to improve the public condi-
tion is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than 
the constitutional way of paying for the change.” 145 
 The Court has made clear that applying these simple platitudes in a 
particular instance is a highly fact-specifi c inquiry, but the leading cases 
share an essential scenario: in each instance, governmental regulation 
has narrowed the range of permissible uses of a landowner’s parcel and 
the owner has challenged the restriction as a “taking.” Most recently, in 
 Lingle v. Chevron , 146 the Court sought to rationalize its somewhat con-
fusing case law and map the proper Fifth Amendment analysis. In two 
instances, the Court noted, regulatory action is a  per se taking for Fifth 
Amendment purposes. First, “where government requires an owner to 
suffer a permanent physical invasion of her property— however minor—
 it must provide just compensation.” 147 Second, a taking occurs in the 
case of “regulations that completely deprive an owner of ‘ all economi-
cally benefi cial use’ of her property.” 148 If we assume that urban gardens 
are a desirable goal that the city seeks to promote through zoning, the 
question for consideration is whether a city like Cleveland lawfully may 
rezone untenanted privately-held land as an urban garden district. We 
consider private land, because the city may do what it wishes with land 
owned by the land bank or otherwise by the city. We assume that the 
land currently has no tenant to avoid the complication of the noncon-
forming use doctrine, which would protect the owner of an improved 
parcel in active use from immediate application of the urban garden des-
ignation. 149 Thus, for example, if the city rezones a parcel that contains 
an occupied and viable private home, the nonconforming use doctrine 
would protect continued use of that property as a residence. 150 
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation being paid. U.S. 
Const. amend. V.
143. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
144. Id. at 415.
145. Id. at 416.
146. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
147. Id. at 538.
148. Id.
149. Juergensmeyer & Roberts, supra note 1, at 118 (“zoning ordinances almost 
universally permit nonconforming uses to continue”).
150. Cleveland, Ohio, Codified Ordinances tit. VII, ch. 359 (2009).
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 The question is whether the city could successfully defend such a 
rezoning, or downzoning, to urban agriculture against a takings chal-
lenge. 151 The viability of such rezoning is likely to be tested soon, as 
the implementation of the  Re-Imagining report includes a study—just 
beginning—to map specifi c locations in Cleveland that are suitable 
for green uses, and a study of economic opportunities associated with 
building a more robust local food economy. 152 
 1. PER SE TAKINGS 
 Does an urban garden designation amount to a  Lucas -style total taking? 
In  Lucas , the Supreme Court held that a taking occurs when a regula-
tion “denies all economically benefi cial or productive use of land.” 153 
In particular, the Court noted that South Carolina’s restriction on Lu-
cas’s property required the land “to be left substantially in its natural 
state. . . .” 154 
 There is an argument that an urban garden designation is a  per se 
taking. The restriction imposed on Lucas prevented him from build-
ing a habitable structure; it did not prevent all use of the land. For ex-
ample, he could build small or non-permanent structures. Consistent 
with the state’s restrictions, it appears that if Lucas wanted to start a 
market garden and sell vegetables to his neighbors on the Isle of Palms 
he could have done so. Indeed, at the trial on Lucas’s claim, the Coastal 
Council’s permit administrator testifi ed that the state would allow con-
struction of temporary structures and recreational or other uses of the 
property. 155 Nonetheless, Lucas was deemed to have suffered a total tak-
ing. Consistent with this view of  Lucas , zoning for urban garden uses 
is a  per se taking. 
 A more compelling reading of the case, however, is that  Lucas does 
not apply to the urban garden. The Court’s decision turns on the trial 
151. The city’s policy would avoid litigation with an existing private land owner 
but it does not prevent any litigation at any point in the future. A subsequent purchaser 
of land zoned for urban gardens still could raise a takings challenge. See Palazzolo v. 
Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). For an interesting discussion of whether the ripeness 
of the claim affects its transferability see, Gregory M. Stein, Takings in the Twenty-First 
Century: Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations After Palazzolo and Tahoe- Sierra, 
69 Tenn. L. Rev. 891 (2002).
152. See Marc Lefkowitz, Rally for Rail and Big Boost to Regenerating Vacant Land 
in Cleveland, Green City Blue Lake (Sept. 30, 2009), http://www.gcbl.org/blog/marc-
lefkowitz/rally-rail-and-big-boost-reimagining-land-use-20 (announcing a grant from 
the Cleveland Foundation for these purposes).
153. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
154. Id. at 1018.
155. Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits at 12-13, Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 
U.S. 1003 (1992) (No. 91-453), 1991 WL 626699 (citing trial transcript).
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court’s fi nding that the land was “valueless.” 156 The Court interpreted 
this to mean that Lucas had suffered a deprivation of “ all economi-
cally benefi cial uses.” 157 At the original trial on his case, Lucas argued 
that because he could not build a single-family home the lots had no 
 value. 158 The trial court agreed that the state’s law “worked a permanent 
and total loss in the value of Lucas’s property.” 159 This factual fi nding 
was not reviewed at any stage in the appellate process, 160 and it was 
an uncontested premise of the petition for certiorari. 161 The majority 
opinion seems to assume that the state’s restriction required Lucas’s 
land to be “left substantially in its natural state,” 162 by which the major-
ity presumably meant his inability to build a permanent structure. Al-
though Justice Blackmun in dissent asserted that the trial court’s fi nding 
was “implausible” 163 and “almost certainly erroneous,” 164 the majority 
declined to enter into this debate. The Court made clear that “we de-
cide the question presented under the same factual assumptions as did 
the Supreme Court of South Carolina.” 165 In subsequent decisions, the 
Court has made clear that the distinctive feature of  Lucas was that the 
state’s restriction deprived Lucas of all economically benefi cial use of 
his property, rendering the property without value. 166 
 The  Lucas opinion therefore does not tell us what type of restriction 
qualifi es as a total taking. The Supreme Court did not evaluate or endorse 
the trial court’s fi nding; it simply accepted the fi nding on its face and 
proceeded from the assumption that the property had no economic value. 
156. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1007.
157. Id. at 1019.
158. Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 155, at 12-13 (citing trial transcript).
159. Id. at 8 (citing trial court decision).
160. Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 85, Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 
U.S. 1003 (1992) (No. 91-453), 1992 WL 672613. The issue before the South Carolina 
Court of Appeals was whether the character of the government’s action (the prevention 
of harm due to beach erosion) should be a factor in the taking analysis. See Lucas, 404 
S.E.2d at 896, 901.
161. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1022 n.9.
162. Id. at 1018.
163. Id. at 1037 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 1044.
165. Id. at 1022 n.9 (majority opinion).
166. E.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005); Tahoe-Sierra 
Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, Inc., 535 U.S. 302, 330 (2002) 
(Lucas is reserved for an “extraordinary circumstance”). There is some room for question 
concerning whether the pertinent factor is a loss of all benefi cial use or a loss of all eco-
nomic value; language in the Tahoe-Sierra opinion uses both phrases. See Tahoe-Sierra 
Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 330 (“valueless” and deprivation of all “benefi cial use”). 
This is not important to resolve in the present context, where the city will argue that a 
viable use remains—urban gardening—and thus the property has not lost all value.
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If a party can argue, as a factual matter, that property zoned for urban 
gardens retains some residual economic value,  Lucas does not apply. 167 
 Although there appears to be no case law on urban garden zoning, 
there are state and lower federal court cases concerning the preservation 
of agricultural uses through agricultural zoning, 168 a restriction that is 
arguably comparable. Agricultural zoning can take a variety of forms 
but in general it restricts permissible uses of the property to agriculture. 
Some agricultural zones allow only agriculture, including only compat-
ible buildings such as barns; others take the form of large lot zoning, 
allowing agricultural uses and a maximum of one house on a large lot 
(possibly anywhere from 10 to 160 acres). 169 Other agricultural zones 
are more generous, allowing some other uses such as stables or day 
nurseries. 170 Agricultural zoning is used in some states where the pres-
sures of urbanization are viewed as a threat to local farming. 171 
 Agricultural zoning challenges can concern either refusal to rezone 
agricultural land or downzoning land from another use. A person might 
buy land zoned for agricultural use and ask that it be rezoned for a 
more intensive use, perhaps residences or industry. If the local zoning 
authorities refuse to rezone, the owner might fi le suit alleging a range 
of legal fl aws with this decision. An alternative scenario would involve 
land that was zoned for residential or other use that is downzoned to a 
more restrictive category of agricultural use only, giving rise to a chal-
lenge by the landowner. 
 In either setting, the plaintiff-land owner has an uphill fi ght. As a 
legislative enactment, the zoning ordinance is entitled to a presump-
tion of validity; the plaintiff must show that it is unlawful. 172 In the vast 
majority of such cases, plaintiffs who allege that agricultural zoning 
167. Some lower court decisions under very similar facts have declined to fi nd a 
Lucas taking. E.g., Gove v. Zoning Bd., 831 N.E.2d 865 (Mass. 2005); see also Palaz-
zolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (holding state restriction on fi lling coastal 
wetlands is not a Lucas taking where a portion of the property may be developed).
168. See infra notes 174, 177, 185, 191, 194, and accompanying text.
169. See Mark W. Cordes, Takings, Fairness and Farmland Preservation, 60 Ohio 
St. L.J. 1033, 1048 (1999); e.g., Barancik v. County of Marin, 872 F.2d 834 (9th Cir. 
1988) (one residence allowed on sixty acres).
170. See, e.g., Christensen v. Yolo County Bd. of Supervisors, 995 F.2d 161, 165 
(9th Cir. 1993) (“agriculture, agricultural buildings, garages, parking areas, stables, 
roadside stands, day nurseries, and day care centers”).
171. Cordes, supra note 169, at 1033-34; see, e.g., Harvard State Bank v. County of 
McHenry, 620 N.E.2d 1360, 1363 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (agricultural zoning defended as 
a buffer against suburban encroachment).
172. In most states zoning decisions are considered legislative, though in a few states 
the rezoning of individual parcels is considered a quasi-judicial action. E.g., Fasano v. 
Bd. of County Comm’rs, 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973).
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is a taking have been unsuccessful, even when the property is down-
zoned from another category allowing greater development. 173 In  Pace 
Resources, Inc. v. Shrewsbury Township , 174 for example, the township 
downzoned the plaintiff’s property from industrial to agricultural use, 
largely because of concerns that the water supply was inadequate for 
industry. Neither the Pennsylvania courts nor the federal court in which 
the plaintiff sought relief held that the rezoning was a taking; both noted 
the existence of residual value. As will be discussed below, the few con-
trary instances generally concern cases in which the land is unsuitable 
for agriculture, so that it has no value as zoned. 175 
 Our discussion at this point must broaden from  Lucas to acknowl-
edge the infl uence of another element in the agricultural zoning cases. 
In many of these cases, two issues blend together: the owner challenges 
the decision as invalid as a matter of zoning law because it is arbitrary 
and not rationally related to a legitimate state interest; the owner might 
also allege that the refusal to rezone (or the downzoning) is a taking. 
The fi rst of these may be couched either as a matter of state law (the 
zoning does not comply with the zoning statute because it is arbitrary) 
or as a constitutional substantive due process challenge. 176 Before the 
173. See Cordes, supra note 169, at 1069.
In sum, lower courts have generally affi rmed the constitutional validity of agricultural 
zoning, and in particular that it should not pose a takings problem if done pursuant to 
sound planning. . . . [T]he decisions largely affi rm and are consistent with Supreme 
Court takings jurisprudence. In particular, lower courts have consistently rejected 
takings challenges as long as the property was economically viable as farmland, even 
when there was a substantial diminution in property value.
Id.; see also Mark W. Cordes, Fairness and Farmland Preservation: A Response to 
Professor Richardson, 20 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 371, 376 (2005) (making the 
same points but with reference to more recently decided Supreme Court cases); Jesse J. 
Richardson, Downzoning, Fairness and Farmland Protection, 19 J. Land Use & 
Envtl. L. 59 (2003) (concluding that downzoning is not likely to be unconstitutional 
but it is unfair).
174. Pace Res., Inc. v. Shrewsbury Twp., 808 F.2d 1023 (3d Cir. 1987). The federal 
court specifi cally noted that the downzoning reduced the land from an alleged value of 
$495,000 to $52,000, but concluded that “although Pace may have been denied the best 
use . . . of its 37 acres, it has not been deprived of all economically viable uses of the 
property.” Id. at 1031.
175. Cordes, supra note 169, at 1060. Other cases have upheld agricultural zoning. 
E.g., Forner v. Allendale Charter Twp., No. 212531, 2000 Mich. App. LEXIS 2202, 
at *23-*24 (Ct. App. May 26, 2000); Gardner v. New Jersey Pinelands Comm’n, 593 
A.2d 251 (N.J. 1991); May v. Bd. of Trs., No. 18997, 2002 WL 1396008 (Ohio Ct. App. 
June 28, 2002).
176. For example, in Gisler v. County of Madera, 112 Cal. Rptr. 919 (Ct. App. 1974) 
the court seemed to address the state law issue of whether zoning was non-arbitrary and 
thus a valid exercise of the police power, but it used language reminiscent of Euclid:
The County, in the exercise of its sound discretion, impliedly determined that the 
minimum 18-acre parcel size is necessary in aid of the preservation of the agricultural 
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Supreme Court’s  Lingle decision in 2005, the takings analysis was con-
fused by a suggestion that the substantive due process and regulatory 
takings analyses overlapped. In the 1980 decision  Agins v. City of Tibu-
ron 177 the Court had observed that a taking occurs “if the ordinance does 
not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner 
economically viable use of the land.” 178 The  Lingle Court noted that 
for many years courts had found a taking if either of these conditions 
appeared, even though the fi rst (the “substantially advances” portion) 
was more properly designated a due process concern. 179 As the  Lingle 
Court noted: 
 Instead of addressing a challenged regulation’s effect on private property, the “sub-
stantially advances” inquiry probes the regulation’s underlying validity. But such an 
inquiry is logically prior to and distinct from the question whether a regulation effects 
a taking, for the Takings Clause presupposes that the government has acted in pursuit 
of a valid public purpose. 180 
 Lingle separated due process from takings concerns for purposes of the 
federal takings analysis. The second part of the  Agins test, of course, 
was adopted in  Lucas: a regulation is a  per se taking if it “denies an 
owner viable use of the land.” 181 Prior to  Lingle , however, states such 
as Ohio might consider both prongs of the  Agins test in evaluating a 
taking. 182 
 Many state court decisions on agricultural zoning refl ect both the sub-
stantive due process and the takings concerns, and sometimes blend the 
character of the area, and since that is a question upon which reasonable minds might 
differ, there should be no judicial interference with the legislative determination.
Id. at 921-22. In Wilson v. Trs., Union Twp., No. CA98-06-036, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 
5025 (Ct. App. 1998) the court made the dual nature of the argument clear: “The police 
power of the government simply ‘does not extend to arbitrary, capricious and unreason-
able’ actions. An ordinance which is enacted outside this permissible scope is unconsti-
tutional because any ordinance that bears no relation to valid police power violates the 
requirements of the due process of law.” Id. at *8 (citations omitted).
177. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
178. Id. at 260 (citations omitted).
179. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 541 (2005).
180. Id. at 543.
181. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
182. Prior to Lingle, the Ohio Supreme Court allowed a taking to be found if a regula-
tion did not substantially advance a legitimate state purpose, without regard to whether 
the property had lost value. E.g., State ex rel. Shemo v. City of Mayfi eld Heights, 765 
N.E.2d 345 (Ohio 2002); Goldberg Cos., Inc. v. Richmond Heights. City Council, 690 
N.E.2d 510 (Ohio 1998). After the Lingle decision, it appears that the Ohio courts will fol-
low the Lingle Court’s lead. See, e.g., State ex rel. Shelly Materials, Inc. v. Clark County 
Bd. of Comm’rs, 875 N.E.2d 59 (Ohio 2007) (following Lingle). For cases relying on 
Agins, see Christensen v. Yolo County Bd. of Supervisors, 995 F.2d 161, 165 (9th Cir. 
1993) and Habersham at Northridge v. Fulton County, 632 F. Supp. 815, 821 (N.D. Ga. 
1985). Both of these are federal cases so their use of a federal standard is not surprising.
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two. 183 With regard to the substantive due process challenge, the gov-
ernment’s action usually is upheld; after all, the legislative action will 
survive a challenge if its validity is “fairly debatable,” 184 which means 
that the plaintiff must clearly and convincingly demonstrate that it is 
arbitrary. In  Gisler v. County of Madera , 185 for example, the California 
court upheld “exclusive agricultural zoning with a minimum 18-acre 
parcel size” on the ground that open space preservation is a valid public 
purpose and the zoning of the subject parcel was not unreasonable. 186 
Municipal governments defend agricultural zoning by documenting 
their plans or policies in favor of protecting agricultural uses, prevent-
ing the spread of uses incompatible with agriculture, and avoiding au-
thorizing development in isolated locations. 187 
 With regard to the takings question, with very few exceptions the 
state cases use an  Agins -type analysis for takings (sometimes citing 
 Agins itself ): they assert that agricultural zoning is a taking when it 
“denies an owner economically viable use of the land.” 188 Thus they ap-
pear to assume that the challenged zoning will survive if the record can 
support a conclusion that some value remains. Courts uphold the zoning 
when there is evidence that the land is suitable for farming or is actu-
ally being farmed, 189 or when the plaintiff simply has not proven that he 
183. E.g., Grand Land Co. v. Twp. Of Bethlehem, 483 A.2d 818, 820 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1984) (not a taking because zoned for a “reasonable use”). The combination 
of the concepts is in full view in Gisler v. County of Madera, 112 Cal. Rptr. 919 (Ct. 
App. 1974), where the court observed that
[i]n certain factual situations it is diffi cult to draw a precise line between a non-
compensable injury resulting from the enactment of a valid regulation under the po-
lice power and regulations which are beyond the limits of the police power and can 
only be justifi ed as a ‘taking’ under the power of eminent domain which requires just 
compensation.
Id. at 921 (citations omitted).
184. This standard, derived from the Euclid case, traditionally is used by courts 
reviewing legislative actions of local authorities. Juergensmeyer & Roberts, supra 
note 1, at 330.
185. Gisler, 112 Cal. Rptr. 919.
186. See id. at 921-22.
187. E.g., Harvard State Bank v. County of McHenry, 620 N.E.2d 1360 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1993) (applying a multifactor test under state law); Racich v. County of Boone, 625 
N.E.2d 1095 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Wilson v. County of McHenry, 416 N.E.2d 426 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1981); Forner v. Allendale Charter Twp., No. 212531, 2000 Mich. App. LEXIS 
2202 (Ct. App. May 26, 2000); Van Arsdel v. Twp. of Addison, 195 N.W.2d 21 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 1972); Codorus Twp. v. Rodgers, 492 A.2d 73 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985).
188. E.g., County of Ada v. Henry, 668 P.2d 994 (Idaho 1983) (applying Agins test 
to fi nd no taking because not all value taken by eighty acre minimum lot zoning); Eck v. 
City of Bismarck, 283 N.W.2d 193, 197 (N.D. 1979), Wilson v. Trs., Union Twp., No. 
CA98-06-036, 1998 Ohio App. Lexis 5025 (Ct. App. Oct. 26, 1998).
189. Grand Land Co. v. Bethlehem, 483 A.2d 818, 820 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1984) (zoning restriction invalid because beyond the powers granted by state law, but 
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cannot use the property as zoned. 190 The owner might assert that farm-
ing is not profi table or does not produce enough revenue to cover taxes. 
This argument was advanced in  Wilson v. County of McHenry , 191 but 
the court observed that the county had presented testimony that better 
farming practices could make the land productive. 192 The case upheld 
agricultural zoning with a 160-acre minimum lot size. 193 
 Cases that fi nd agricultural zoning to be a taking generally focus on 
the unsuitability of the land for farming. Thus, two cases found that 
the agricultural zoning category was not valid because it is being used 
simply as a holding zone, not as an actual source of agricultural produc-
tivity. In  Petersen v. City of Decorah , 194 the plaintiff’s land was zoned 
for agriculture even though it had not been farmed for over thirty years; 
the city admitted that it was using the agricultural classifi cation as a 
holding zone, waiting for the right type of industrial use to come along. 
The Iowa court held that this was “unreasonable and confi scatory.” 195 
In  Kmiec v. Town of Spider Lake 196 the Wisconsin court found that the 
plaintiff’s land had “a substantial negative value” as farmland; use of 
agricultural zoning as a “holding district” to control future development 
was “unreasonable” and unconstitutional on due process grounds. 197 
 Two other cases, both in Illinois, applied that state’s multifactor test 
to conclude that agricultural zoning of particular property was arbitrary 
as a matter of state law.  Smeja v. County of Boone concerned 50 acres 
not a taking because agriculture is a “reasonable use” and “not economically infea-
sible”); Vanderburgh County Bd. of Comm’rs v. Rittenhouse, 575 N.E.2d 663 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1991) (plaintiffs failed to show the property “cannot be reasonably be used under 
the present zoning classifi cation,” testimony showed the land was farmable, taking ar-
gument rejected); Bell River Assocs. v. China Charter Twp, 565 N.W.2d 695, 699-700 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1997); Mays v. Bd. of Trs., No. 18997, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 3347 
at *24-*25 (Ct. App. June 28, 2002); Joyce v. City of Portland, 546 P.2d 1100 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1976).
190. Forner v. Allendale Charter Twp., No. 212531, 2000 Mich. App. LEXIS 2202 
(Ct. App. May 26, 2000); Wilson v. Trs., Union Twp., No. CA98-06-036, 1998 Ohio 
App. LEXIS 5025 (Ct. App. Oct. 26, 1998); Smythe v. Butler Twp., 620 N.E. 2d 901 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1993); Murray v. Columbia River Gorge Comm’n, 865 P.2d 1319 (Or. 
Ct. App. 1993); Chokecherry Hills Estate v. Deuel County, 294 N.W.2d 654 (S.D. 
1980).
191. Wilson v. County of McHenry, 416 N.E.2d 426 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
192. Id. at 429.
193. In Barancik v. County of Marin, 872 F.2d 834 (9th Cir. 1988), the plaintiffs 
alleged that the ranch cost as much or more in taxes as it produced in revenue, but the 
court did not fi nd a taking.
194. Petersen v. City of Decorah, 259 N.W.2d 553 (Iowa Ct. App. 1977).
195. Id. at 555.
196. Kmiec v. Town of Spider Lake, 211 N.W.2d 471, 477 (Wis. 1973).
197. Id. at 475-77.
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zoned for agriculture; the owner wanted it to be rezoned for  residences. 198 
The trial court concluded that the agricultural zoning was “unconstitu-
tional and invalid,” and the appellate court affi rmed. 199 Illinois courts 
evaluate the validity of a zoning ordinance by taking into account factors 
such as the uses and zoning of nearby properties, the extent to which the 
existing zoning diminishes the property’s value, the suitability of the 
property for the zoned purpose, and the relative gain to the public and 
burden on the owner of the existing and the proposed zoning uses. 200 
The testimony in  Smeja was that 15 acres of the tract were “submar-
ginal land not particularly desirable for the raising of crops” and that 
the remaining 35 acres were wooded. 201 The appellate court’s decision 
displays general skepticism about the value of agricultural zoning; in 
particular the court saw little public benefi t in maintaining such a tract 
as agricultural. 202 Similarly, in  Pettee v. County of De Kalb , 203 the plain-
tiff sought to rezone agricultural land to allow residences and a small 
aircraft landing fi eld. The trial court found that the agricultural zoning 
was “arbitrary and unreasonable,” and the Illinois appellate court af-
fi rmed. 204 One key fi nding was that the land was “largely unsuitable 
for farming.” 205 The appellate court also offered the view that although 
“farmland might well be characterized as an essential natural resource,” 
in the court’s view “the evidence fails to disclose why plaintiff’s land 
specifi cally should be so preserved for the general benefi t.” 206 
 Finally, some cases conclude that the municipality’s action was ir-
rational because of other failings. In  Harris Bank of Hinsdale v. County 
of Kendall , 207 the Illinois appellate court agreed with a trial court’s fi nd-
ing that refusal to rezone agricultural land was arbitrary and unreason-
able. There was no suggestion that the land was unsuitable for farming; 
instead a signifi cant factor was that the county’s own plan designated 
the area for urbanization. 208 In  Twigg v. County of Will , 209 the plaintiffs 
wanted to subdivide their rural land to build residences for family mem-
198. See Smeja v. County of Boone, 339 N.E.2d 452 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
199. Id. at 456.
200. Id. at 454.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 455.
203. Pettee v. County of De Kalb, 376 N.E.2d 720 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 725.
206. Id.
207. Harris Bank v. County of Kendall, 625 N.E.2d 845 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
208. Id. at 851.
209. Twigg v. County of Will, 627 N.E.2d 742 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
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bers and others. Again there was no showing that the land could not be 
used to grow crops; instead, a key fi nding was that “the evidence tended 
to show that the current zoning of the area, including plaintiffs’ tract, 
was assigned in an arbitrary manner without considering the several 
non-conforming uses existing when the land-use plan was adopted and 
the zoning ordinance was enacted.” 210 
 In light of these cases, the City of Cleveland is likely to be able to 
defend its agricultural zoning against a suggestion of a  Lucas taking, 
as well as a charge of arbitrariness. Cleveland has a lively and active 
urban gardening and farming community, including a variety of farms 
for profi t, all of which are relatively small scale and focus on niche 
or high-value produce. 211 The viability of urban farming for profi t was 
specifi cally evaluated in a study in Philadelphia, which—although it 
concerned a limited range of agriculture—concluded that profi table 
urban farming is possible. 212 Like any other business, it requires skilled 
planning, production, and marketing, but it can be done. 
 Cleveland can build a record to support its contention that an Urban 
Garden Designation was rationally selected for a particular piece of 
land and has value for the owner of a particular parcel. The analogy 
to agricultural zoning is clear in the case of a market garden, which is 
agriculture on a small scale: the gardener sells crops for income. Thus 
the use of a parcel of land for profi table urban farming, as part of an 
overall plan of promoting urban gardens, is both rational and—under 
these cases, which reach only the  Lucas form of taking—not a taking. 
First, the use of the Urban Garden Designation is a considered, planned 
aspect of Cleveland’s zoning structure.  Re-Imagining —which has been 
adopted by the Cleveland Planning Commission—envisions a prolif-
eration of urban gardens, raising them from isolated curiosities to a pro-
ductive and commonplace element of city life. 213 Second, Cleveland has 
210. Id. at 746.
211. For further evidence of the vitality of the urban farming and garden commu-
nity in Cleveland, see Mark Lefkowitz, Green City Blue Lake, Tour Nine Urban Farms 
in Cleveland This Saturday (July 2, 2009) http://www.gcbl.org/blog/marc-lefkowitz/
tour-nine-urban-farms-cleveland-saturday, as well as Local Food Cleveland, http://
www.localfoodcleveland.org (last visited Mar. 10, 2010), Urban Growth, http://www.
urbangrowthfarms.com (last visited Mar. 10, 2010), and Cleveland-Cuyahoga County 
Food Policy Coalition, http://www.cccfoodpolicy.org (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
212. See Urban Partners, Farming in Philadelphia: Feasibility Analysis 
and Next Steps 1-3 (2007), available at http://www.spinfarming.com/common/pdfs/
STF_inst_for_innovations_exec_summary_dec07.pdf.
213. See Re-Imagining, supra note 18, at 28.
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identifi ed a rational method by which to identify sites that are suitable 
for community gardens, as illustrated in  Re-Imagining . 214 Assuming 
that the city has an adequate factual basis for each rezoning decision, 215 
and recognizing that—on appropriate land—urban gardening can be 
economically viable, a claim of a  Lucas -style taking seems unlikely to 
be successful. As the Supreme Court has made clear, the presence of 
any residual economic value precludes the application of  Lucas . 216 
 The above argument relies heavily upon agricultural zoning cases, so 
it is fair to ask whether rural agricultural zoning really is comparable to 
an urban garden. Arguably there must be a difference between preserv-
ing agriculture at the edge of a city and promoting agriculture at the 
heart of one. In the shrinking city context, however, we must recognize 
the ambiguity of the terms “agriculture” and “city.” The term “agricul-
ture” encompasses any form of cultivating the soil, producing crops, or 
raising livestock; it is not restricted to industrial farming on hundreds 
of acres. And a “city” in the case of places like Detroit and Cleveland is 
urban without overall high density; the central problem of a shrinking 
city is an excess of vacant or under-used land. 
 Of course there are differences in purpose. One common purpose of 
agricultural zoning is to preserve farmland from urban encroachment; 
the Urban Garden District, by contrast, seeks to return nominally urban 
land to agricultural status. One key defense of agricultural zoning often 
is the agricultural nature of the surrounding land. The Urban Garden 
District is likely to be an isolated garden used in a city. In the words of 
 Euclid , we are putting the pig in the parlor, where some might think it 
does not belong. 217 
 These are distinctions between the two types of zones, without a 
doubt, but they do not eliminate the essential value of the comparison. 
In terms of rationality or substantive due process, the city’s rationale 
for an urban garden, although different from the rationale for agri-
214. Id. at 9 fi g.7.
215. If instead the designation is arbitrary, without adequate factual basis, it is vul-
nerable to challenge on that ground without the need to show a taking. E.g., Jaylin Invs., 
Inc. v. Vill. of Moreland Hills, 839 N.E.2d 903 (Ohio 2006).
216. E.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005); Tahoe-Sierra 
Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, Inc., 535 U.S. 302, 330 (2002). For 
example, in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, the state’s restrictions on fi lling coastal wetlands 
precluded the plaintiff from building a proposed 74-lot subdivision. Palazzolo v. Rhode 
Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). The Court found no Lucas taking, because he still could 
build a single house on an upland portion of the parcel. Id. As the Court pointed out, 
“A regulation permitting a landowner to build a substantial residence on an 18-acre 
parcel does not leave the property ‘economically idle.’ ” Id. at 632 (quoting Lucas).
217. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 391, 394-95 (1926).
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cultural zoning, can withstand scrutiny under the relaxed standard of 
 Euclid . The regulatory taking argument is the same in both instances: 
that the restriction of the land to agricultural purposes is confi scatory; 
and the response is the same: that agriculture is an economically ben-
efi cial use. 
 It should be noted that the Cleveland urban garden district also allows 
community gardens, which do not directly produce income, and none 
of the cases consider whether farming for one’s own consumption or 
donation is a suffi cient economically benefi cial use to avoid the charge 
of a taking. However, the takings analysis asks whether property can 
be used as zoned, and the urban garden category allows both market 
and community gardens. Consequently, as long as the site is zoned for 
both market and community gardens and is suitable for gardening, the 
agricultural zoning cases can assist Cleveland in defending its zoning 
category against a charge of a  Lucas taking. The takings issue would be 
much more diffi cult if the zoning allowed nonprofi t community gardens 
alone, and would raise interesting questions about the type of economi-
cally benefi cial use that the Supreme Court would accept to defeat a 
takings claim. 218 
 2. TAKING UNDER  PENN CENTRAL 
 If an urban garden district designation is not a  per se taking under 
 Lucas , there remains the possibility that a court could hold that it is a 
taking under the multi-factor analysis of  Penn Central . 219 In  Penn Cen-
tral , the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the application of New 
York City’s Landmarks Law to Grand Central Station, where New York 
had denied Penn Central permission to build a modern offi ce tower on 
top of the existing, classically elegant terminal building. 220 
 The  Penn Central decision instructed us to consider the economic 
impact of the regulation on the landowner, and in particular the extent to 
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed ex-
pectations, and the “character of the government action.” 221 In applying 
these factors, the Court recently explained in  Lingle , we evaluate “the 
218. In Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), the Supreme Court famously rec-
ognized that cultivation of wheat on one’s own property for one’s own consumption 
nonetheless was suffi ciently related to interstate commerce to implicate the Commerce 
Clause. This holding recently was upheld in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (cul-
tivation and use of marijuana for medical purposes). Perhaps these cases provide a start-
ing point for an argument that even a community garden is an economic use.
219. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
220. Id.
221. The Penn Central list of factors is discussed in Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538-39.
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severity of the burden that government imposes upon private property 
rights.” 222 Our goal is to “identify regulatory actions that are function-
ally equivalent to the classic taking in which government directly ap-
propriates private property or ousts the owner from his domain.” 223 In 
the  Penn Central context, we consider “the magnitude of a regulation’s 
economic impact and the degree to which it interferes with legitimate 
property interests.” 224 
 The  Penn Central/Lingle test is more easily stated than applied. What 
does it mean to conclude that a regulatory restriction is “functionally 
equivalent” to a classic taking? When the government seizes property 
by eminent domain it ousts the landowner from the property and ac-
quires title itself. Thus the landowner loses all of the attributes of own-
ership: he loses title to the property and thus cannot possess it, exclude 
others from it, use the property, or sell it to somebody else. 
 It is unclear how any restriction that does not essentially eradicate 
one or more of the attributes of ownership would be functionally equiv-
alent to eminent domain. By defi nition any regulation evaluated under 
 Penn Central has less effect on the owner than either a physical inva-
sion (held to be a  per se taking in  Loretto v. Teleprompter) 225 or the 
 Lucas setting. Indeed, the  Penn Central analysis relatively seldom leads 
a court to conclude that a taking has occurred. 226 
 In addition, although the  Penn Central Court identifi ed three factors, 
it offered no guidance concerning how they are to be weighed. Argu-
ably it even eschewed offering guidance, by stating that takings analysis 
involves “essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.” 227 Some have questioned 
whether the  Penn Central Court applied its own test in the  Penn Central 
decision, 228 so it is small wonder that many judicial decisions describe 
222. Id. at 539.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 540.
225. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
226. See Walcek v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 248, 271-72 (2001); Cordes, supra 
note 169, at 378.
227. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
228. After it outlined the principles governing its decision in the fi rst few parts of the 
opinion, the Court then states:
We now must consider whether the interference with appellant’s property is of such 
a magnitude that ‘there must be an exercise of eminent domain. . . .’ That inquiry may 
be narrowed to the question of the severity of the impact of the law on appellant’s 
parcel, and its resolution in turn requires a careful assessment of the impact of the 
regulation on the Terminal site.
Id. at 136.
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the factors, briefl y explain how each is featured in the case before it, and 
(usually) conclude that no taking has occurred. 229 Nonetheless, we are 
required to follow the instructions in  Lingle and apply the  Penn Central 
analysis to the problem of the urban garden. 
 a. Economic Impact 
 The  Penn Central decision introduced the issue of economic impact by 
phrasing it as follows: 
 In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, the Court’s decision have 
identifi ed several factors that have particular signifi cance. The economic impact of 
the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has 
interfered with distinct investment backed expectations are of course relevant consid-
erations. . . . So, too, is the character of the governmental action. 230 
 In the  Lingle decision, the Court repeated this language. 231 The  Penn 
Central Court’s use of the words “several factors” and “relevant con-
siderations” suggests that, with regard to economic effect, the Court 
had two elements in mind: the “economic impact” as a whole, and the 
impact on “investment-backed expectations” as part of that effect. 232 
 Thus it has become customary to consider the extent to which the 
restriction at issue reduces the value of the property: is it worth signifi -
cantly less with the restriction than it would be if the restriction were 
removed? For example, the economic impact of prohibiting fi lling a wet-
land might be less than the economic impact of prohibiting construction 
on comparably located dry land, because the cost of construction in a 
wetland is much higher and thus the site is less desirable for building. 233 
At the same time, however, the  Penn Central Court cautioned against 
giving a signifi cant loss in value too much weight: 
 Appellants concede that the decisions sustaining other land use regulations, which, 
like the New York City [landmarks] law, are reasonably related to the promotion 
of the general welfare, uniformly reject the proposition that diminution in property 
value, standing alone, can establish a “taking” and that the “taking” issue in these 
contexts is resolved by focusing on the uses the regulations permit. 234 
229. E.g., District Intown Props. Ltd. P’ship. v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874 
(D.C. Cir. 1999); Zanghi v. Bd. of Appeals, 807 N.E.2d 221 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004). For 
an example of a case concluding that a Penn Central taking has occurred, see Florida 
Rock Indus. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 21 (1999).
230. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
231. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538-39 (2005).
232. See id.
233. E.g., Palazzolo v. State, No. WM 88-0297, 2005 WL 1645974 (R.I. Super. Ct. 
Jul. 5, 2005) (disposition of case on remand from the Supreme Court, taking the cost of 
construction in a marsh into account in evaluating economic impact).
234. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 131.
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 This language suggests that the more signifi cant part of the inquiry con-
cerns the interference with investment-backed expectations concerning 
permissible or reasonable uses of the land. 
 Nonetheless, we must consider the extent to which an Urban Garden 
designation is likely to diminish the value of the owner’s land. Here, 
the question is whether rezoning vacant land from a residential, indus-
trial, or commercial category to an urban garden zone would have a 
signifi cant effect on the land’s value. In the absence of a specifi c case, 
we cannot know the precise answer to this question. The  Re-Imagining 
report suggests, however, that the city would not designate as urban 
garden any land that has signifi cant development potential. 235 Moreover, 
the assumption of the  Re-Imagining model is that Cleveland has large 
quantities of excess land that need to be brought into productive use, 
and that an urban garden—as opposed to a vacant lot—is a productive 
use. Indeed, the Cleveland zoning code envisions urban gardens as a 
way of enhancing the city, by providing green space, a food resource, 
and a community gathering place. 236 This assumption perhaps chal-
lenges traditional understanding of an economically benefi cial urban 
use but, in the context of the shrinking city, has some appeal. Thus we 
can conclude that the rezoning is unlikely to result in a signifi cant dimi-
nution of value, bearing in mind that the assumption would be tested in 
a particular case. 237 
 b. Investment-Backed Expectations 
 The second element of the  Penn Central analysis is “the extent to 
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed 
expectations.” 238 The Court did not offer much explanation of what it 
meant by this term, other than the following: “[T]his Court has dismissed 
“taking” challenges on the ground that, while the challenged Govern-
ment action caused economic harm, it did not interfere with interests 
that were suffi ciently bound up with the reasonable expectations of the 
claimant to constitute “property” for Fifth Amendment purposes.” 239 
Taken at face value, this suggests that only an actual property interest 
235. Re-Imagining, supra note 18, at 9.
236. See Cleveland, Ohio, Codified Ordinances, tit. VII, ch. 336.01 (2009).
237. If signifi cant development pressures emerge at some point in the future, nothing 
prevents the City—after an appropriate public hearing and consideration—from rezon-
ing the land for a more intensive use. If it declines to rezone, the scenario becomes one 
with which we are familiar: an owner of land zoned for a less intensive use seeks rezon-
ing to a higher use; when permission is refused, the owner fi les suit, alleging a taking.
238. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
239. Id. at 124-25.
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qualifi es as an investment-backed expectation. One example of such an 
interest would be a vested right in development, which can arise under 
common law when a property owner has committed suffi cient resources 
to construction in compliance with a valid permit, 240 or by statute in 
states that have adopted statutory criteria for vesting. 241 A person with 
a vested right to fi nish a project is protected from any change in zoning 
that might prohibit completion (as when a developer already is building 
houses when land is rezoned for commercial use). Lower courts have 
concluded that a vested right can be a property interest and thus an 
investment-backed expectation for purposes of  Penn Central . 242 
 What else might qualify as an investment-backed expectation? The 
role of expectations arose in  Palazzolo v. Rhode Island , 243 in which a 
land owner challenged a Rhode Island law prohibiting fi lling coastal 
wetlands. Prior to that decision, many state courts took the position that 
a person who acquired land with knowledge of a regulatory restriction 
could not claim a taking when the restriction was applied. Acquisition 
with notice, the courts reasoned, precluded any reasonable expectation 
of development. 244 The Supreme Court rejected that view in  Palazzolo . 
If the restriction was a taking for the previous owner, it remained a tak-
ing when applied to the new owner: “[some] enactments are unreason-
able and do not become less so through the passage of time or title . . . 
A State would be allowed, in effect, to put an expiration date on the 
Takings Clause. This ought not to be the rule.” 245 This was enough to de-
cide a key issue in the case: the pre-existing restriction on fi lling coastal 
wetlands did not defeat Palazzolo’s takings claim and the case was re-
manded for consideration under  Penn Central . 246 
 In a concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor offered her views con-
cerning the relevance of a pre-existing restriction to a  Penn Central 
analysis: 
 Today’s holding does not mean that the timing of the regulation’s enactment relative 
to the acquisition of title is immaterial to the  Penn Central analysis . . . Under [ Penn 
Central ] interference with investment-backed expectations is one of a number of 
factors that a court must examine. Further, the regulatory regime in place at the time 
240. E.g., W. Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980).
241. E.g., Va. Code Ann. § 15.2-2307 (2009).
242. See, e.g., Pace Res., Inc. v. Shrewsbury Twp., 808 F.2d 1023, 1033 (3d Cir. 
1987) (suggesting that a vested right is a property interest and thus a “distinct invest-
ment backed expectation” for purposes of Penn Central).
243. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
244. See id. at 613.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 632.
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the claimant acquires the property at issue helps to shape the reasonableness of those 
expectations. 247 
 She concluded: “[c]ourts properly consider the effect of existing regula-
tions under the rubric of investment-backed expectations in determin-
ing whether a compensable taking has occurred.” 248 Justice O’Connor 
linked investment-backed expectations to the fairness concerns that she 
thought underlie the regulatory takings analysis. 249 Under this view, 
the concept of a “reasonable” investment-backed expectation refers to 
something that can be less than a property interest but must be more 
than a unilateral desire; it is an objectively reasonable expectation of 
how a person might use his property. 250 Justice O’Connor specifi cally 
noted that this reasonable expectation could arise “without vesting any 
kind of development right in the property owner.” 251 
 Justice O’Connor’s views on investment-backed expectations were 
endorsed in the majority opinion in  Tahoe-Sierra . 252 In  Tahoe-Sierra , 
the landowners argued that the planning agency’s lengthy moratorium 
on all development in affected areas around Lake Tahoe amounted to a 
 per se taking for the period of the moratorium. The Court rejected this 
view, thereby declining to expand the settings in which a  per se takings 
rule would apply. Instead, the Court signaled its support for the fact-
specifi c case by case approach of  Penn Central . 253 It singled out for ap-
proval Justice O’Connor’s  Palazzolo language concerning fairness and 
the role of the regulatory environment in shaping investment-backed 
expectations. 254 The  Tahoe-Sierra Court noted that the precise question 
247. Id. at 633 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
248. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 635-36.
249. Id. at 633.
250. See id. at 634-35. Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion took the opposite view: a 
pre-existing restriction “should have no bearing upon the determination of whether the 
restriction is so substantial as to constitute a taking.” A person is not expected to take 
into account “the assumed validity of a restriction that . . . deprives property of so much 
of its value as to be unconstitutional.” Id. at 637 (Scalia, J. concurring). Of the two, Jus-
tice O’Connor’s view seems more representative of how a reasonable developer might 
think: given the cost and unpredictability of litigation, it seems safer to assume that a 
restriction is valid than to assume the opposite. Justice Scalia’s view has the appeal of 
greater logical purity. The courts tend to follow Justice O’Connor. Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. 
United States, 381 F.3d 1338, 1348-49 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Cane Tenn., Inc. v. United States, 
No. 96-237 L, 2004 U.S. Claims Lexis 359 (Fed. Cl. 2004); see also Ruckelshaus v. 
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005-06 (1984) (stating reasonable investment-backed 
expectations “must be more than a ‘unilateral expectation or an abstract need’ ”).
251. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 635.
252. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 
(2002).
253. Id. at 320-21.
254. Id. at 335.
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in  Palazzolo (the temporal relationship between regulatory enactments 
and the acquisition of title) was not before it but it endorsed the concept 
of an analysis focusing on fairness and justice in each case. 255 
 A few years later in  Lingle , though, the Court (through Justice 
O’Connor again) suggested that perhaps the defi nition of investment-
backed expectations should be narrowed to quasi-property rights: “[t]he 
 Penn Central inquiry turns in large part, albeit not exclusively, upon the 
magnitude of a regulation’s economic impact and the degree to which it 
interferes with legitimate property interests.” 256 
 With this limited and somewhat unclear guidance, the lower courts 
seem to give weight to investment-backed expectations if the landowner 
committed resources to development, when that action was reasonable 
in light of the facts (such as the property and its surroundings, and their 
suitability for development) and the regulatory climate existing at the 
time of investment. 257 The  Palazzolo case on remand provides an un-
usually well-considered example. The Rhode Island court considered 
whether a residential development on Palazzolo’s land would be likely 
to be successful, noting Palazzolo’s lack of experience in real estate 
development and the lack of other residential subdivisions in the area. 258 
The court emphasized the great expense associated with building houses 
in a marsh. 259 The court noted that Rhode Island had never consented 
to fi lling the marshland on Palazzolo’s parcel and that Palazzolo’s title 
to the property “is clearly subject to the public trust doctrine,” so that 
Palazzolo’s “reasonable investment-backed expectations must be mea-
sured against the premise that the one-half of Plaintiff’s property which 
lies below mean high water can never be fi lled absent state approval.” 260 
Finally, the court referred to the “growing nationwide movement to-
ward the preservation of ecologically valuable sites during the last half 
of the twentieth century,” including various Rhode Island enactments 
prohibiting fi lling wetlands of which Palazzolo was aware. 261 Thus the 
court on remand looked for overall indicia of reasonable expectations, 
255. Id. at 335-36.
256. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005).
257. For an interesting survey of how state courts have handled this concept, see 
J. David Breemer, Playing the Expectations Game: When Are Investment-Backed Land 
Use Expectations (Un)reasonable in State Courts?, 38 Urb. Law. 81 (2006).
258. Palazzolo v. State, No. WM 88-0297, 2005 WL 1645974 at *12 (R.I. Super. 
Ct. Jul. 5, 2005).
259. Id. at *13.
260. Id.
261. Id. at *14 n.78.
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without seeming to consider whether those expectations needed to be 
strong enough to amount to a property interest. 
 What, then, can one say about an urban garden zone? What is the 
expectation with which it might interfere? We know that, as a general 
rule, Cleveland may change the zoning of a parcel without compensat-
ing the owner for any change in value. In the absence of a vested right, 
no person has a property interest in unchanged zoning. 262 If we assume 
that the city rezones untenanted private land previously designated for 
residential, commercial, or industrial use as an urban garden, we have to 
consider whether this interferes with an owner’s reasonable expectation 
of development.  Lucas suggests that, in general, a person has a right to 
expect to be able to build  something —that the deprivation of the right 
to build any permanent structure looks like a taking. But the agricultural 
zoning cases remind us that the courts are willing to accept zoning that 
allows productive use without requiring that the use allow actual con-
struction of buildings. 
 Thus we must consider the likely specifi c circumstances of an urban 
garden site in a shrinking city. We must assume that the city plans to 
rezone land for urban gardens only where it concludes that the specifi c 
parcel does not have a reasonable prospect of more intensive devel-
opment in the foreseeable future. This is the policy expressed in  Re-
Imagining . Moreover, the city’s judgment is likely to be supported by 
the overall climate of a shrinking city, in which there is more land avail-
able than is needed to supply current or foreseeable future development. 
True, even today speculators are purchasing lots in Cleveland by the 
dozens on the theory that they might prove valuable in the future, but 
it is notable that many of these are out-of-state individuals unfamiliar 
with Cleveland. 263 Under these circumstances, it is likely that the city 
could present a strong case that reasonable expectations of future devel-
opment of a particular parcel must be modest or non-existent. 
 Could a city sustain an urban garden zone if the market for land un-
dergoes a dramatic change in the future? At this point we would be 
even farther into the realm of speculation, and it is possible that the 
city would change its mind and, after appropriate public hearings, re-
zone the parcel. If it does not, the agricultural zoning cases suggest 
that an urban garden district could resist an expectations-based takings 
262. E.g., Zanghi v. Bd. of Appeals, 807 N.E.2d 221, 226 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004); 
see Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992) (property owners must 
expect that land use regulations will change over time).
263. Kotlowitz, supra note 29.
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challenge even if development pressures increase. Indeed, many agri-
cultural zoning cases are decided in the face of pressure for more in-
tense development—a pressure that agricultural zoning is specifi cally 
intended to resist. 264 
 c. Character of Regulation 
 The fi nal factor in the  Penn Central analysis is the “character of the gov-
ernment action.” The meaning of this is not clear in  Penn Central , nor 
has the Court clarifi ed it on any subsequent occasion. Commentators 
acknowledge that it is something of a mystery. 265 In  Penn Central itself, 
the Court characterized this factor as follows: “A ‘taking’ may more 
readily be found when the interference with property can be character-
ized as a physical invasion by Government . . . than when interference 
arises from some public program adjusting the benefi ts and burdens of 
economic life to promote the common good.” 266 
 This language suggests that the only issue is whether the government 
has engaged in some form of a physical invasion. It is possible that this 
is all the Court meant, because apparently it derived its reference to 
“character” from the  Causby case, where the term was used to refer to a 
physical invasion of an owner’s property. 267 Only a few years after  Penn 
Central , the  Loretto case held that such an invasion would be a  per se 
taking. 268 If the  Penn Central character factor has any meaning today, it 
must be elsewhere. 
 Later in  Penn Central , the Court states that “Government actions that 
may be characterized as acquisitions of resources to permit or facilitate 
uniquely public functions have often been held to constitute ‘takings,’ ” 
citing the  Causby case again. 269 In  Causby , the United States landed 
264. Cordes, supra note 169, at 1033-34; see, e.g., Harvard State Bank v. County of 
McHenry, 620 N.E. 2d 1360, 1363 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (agricultural zoning defended as 
a buffer against suburban encroachment).
265. E.g., Michael B. Kent, Jr., Construing the Canon: An Exegesis of Regulatory 
Takings Jurisprudence After Lingle v. Chevron, 16 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 63, 101 (2008); 
see also R. S. Radford, Just a Flesh Wound? The Impact of Lingle v. Chevron on Regu-
latory Takings Law, 38 Urb. Law. 437, 448 (2006) (“What considerations might rea-
sonably be included in the ‘character’ calculus remains as great a mystery today as the 
day Penn Central was drafted.”).
266. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (citation 
omitted).
267. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946) (“As stated in United States v. 
Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 328, [itself a case involving physical invasion by fl oodwater,] it is 
the character of the invasion, not the amount of damage resulting from it, so long as the 
damage is substantial, that determines the question whether it is a taking.”).
268. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
269. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 128.
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military aircraft at a nearby airport by fl ying low over the claimant’s 
land, frightening the chickens and disrupting the lives of the owners. 
The Supreme Court agreed with the court of claims that the government 
had in effect taken an easement over the property. 270 
 Still later in the  Penn Central opinion, the Court notes that the  Penn 
Central plaintiffs describe  Causby as an instance in which “Govern-
ment, acting in an enterprise capacity, has appropriated part of their 
property for some strictly governmental purpose.” 271 The Court rejected 
this suggestion: 
 Apart from the fact that  Causby was a case of invasion of airspace that destroyed 
the use of the farm beneath and this New York City law has in nowise impaired the 
present use of the Terminal, the Landmarks Law neither exploits appellants’ parcel 
for city purposes nor facilitates nor arises from any entrepreneurial operations of the 
city. 272 
 The Court thus disagreed with the notion that the application of the 
New York landmark law to Grand Central Station was an action in an 
enterprise capacity; the Court did not disagree with the suggestion that 
an action in an enterprise capacity might have a particularly dubious 
character. 273 
 These two descriptions of the character factor—the acquisition of re-
sources for “uniquely public functions” and the appropriation of prop-
erty to help a government in an “enterprise capacity”—have slightly 
different implications. The fi rst might apply to a green space designa-
270. Causby, 328 U.S. at 267. The Court described the facts as follows:
[The airplanes] come close enough at times to appear barely to miss the tops of the 
trees and at times so close to the tops of the trees as to blow the old leaves off. The 
noise is startling. And at night the glare from the planes brightly lights up the place. 
As a result of the noise, respondents had to give up their chicken business. As many 
as six to ten of their chickens were killed in one day by fl ying into the walls from 
fright. The total chickens lost in that manner was about 150. Production also fell off. 
The result was the destruction of the use of the property as a commercial chicken 
farm. Respondents are frequently deprived of their sleep and the family has become 
nervous and frightened.
Id. at 259.
271. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 135.
272. Id.
273. The Causby Court rested its fi nding of a taking on the concept of a physical 
intrusion:
The superadjacent airspace at this low altitude is so close to the land that continu-
ous invasions of it affect the use of the surface of the land itself. We think that the 
landowner, as an incident to his ownership, has a claim to it and that invasions of it 
are in the same category as invasions of the surface.
Causby, 328 U.S. at 265. Causby itself does not include any language using an “enter-
prise capacity” theory, and indeed it did not need to, as the fi nding of a physical intru-
sion was suffi cient.
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tion for property, when the purpose is fl ood control to benefi t the public. 
Although the government always regulates in the public interest, this re-
striction is particularly severe and in effect dedicates the land to a public 
purpose, with no room for private use (other than recreational strolls 
when the premises are not fl ooded). Perhaps this is an action of ques-
tionable “character,” though this does not add much to our understand-
ing: in this instance we need not reach the issue of character because, as 
discussed below, this looks like a  Lucas per se taking. 
 The second (enterprise capacity) might apply when a government 
undertakes a function that might have been handled privately, such as 
when a government builds a convention center. As an example, assume 
a city builds a convention center and then realizes that it has not built 
enough parking spaces to serve the center. In order to solve this prob-
lem, the city zones vacant land adjacent to the center “parking lot only.” 
Although the rezoning might survive substantive due process scrutiny 
because it is rationally related to a legitimate public purpose (promoting 
urban development by facilitating the use of a convention center), and 
the land may well retain signifi cant economic value as a parking lot, 
something about the character of the action seems like a taking. The city 
has used its governmental power to obtain parking capacity for its new 
convention center without paying for it. 
 In this latter “enterprise capacity” setting, some have argued that the 
government’s action always looks like a taking. Indeed, it is possible 
that the  Penn Central litigants were thinking of an infl uential article 
by Prof. Joseph Sax in which he presented this argument. 274 However, 
this enterprise capacity theory does not seem to have been adopted or 
endorsed in any reported decisions. 275 
 The most recent mention of character is in the  Lingle decision. As 
noted earlier,  Lingle pared away from the taking analysis an element 
that had confused it for some time: the suggestion in some of the cases 
that a regulation can be a taking if it fails to substantially advance a 
legitimate state purpose. 276 The  Lingle Court stated that this is a factor 
related to due process concerns, not a taking: 
274. Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L.J. 36, 62-63 (1964); 
see also Carlos A. Ball, The Curious Intersection of Nuisance and Takings Law, 86 
B.U. L. Rev. 819, 844 (2006) (“when the government competes for resources, it is more 
likely to overreach than when it arbitrates the use of resources by others . . . because 
there is an incentive in the former circumstance to acquire resources without having to 
pay for them”).
275. The concept is mentioned in Coast Range Conifers, LLC v. State, 117 P.3d 990, 
995 n.10 (Or. 2005), but without success for its advocates.
276. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 541 (2005).
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 In stark contrast to the three regulatory takings tests discussed above [ Loretto, Lucas , 
and  Penn Central ], the “substantially advances” inquiry reveals nothing about the 
 magnitude or character of the burden a particular regulation imposes upon private 
property rights. Nor does it provide any information about how any regulatory bur-
den is  distributed among property owners. In consequence, this test does not help to 
identify those regulations whose effects are functionally comparable to government 
appropriation or invasion of private property; it is tethered neither to the text of the 
Takings Clause nor to the basic justifi cation for allowing regulatory actions to be 
challenged under the Clause. 277 
 By removing the “substantially advances” component from the takings 
analysis, the Court suggests that we are not concerned with the strength 
of the public interest the regulation serves; we are only concerned with 
the magnitude and distribution of the burden the regulation imposes. 278 
 Perhaps this is what  Lingle tells us “character” means: an action with 
a greater or more unfair burden on use looks more like a taking, even 
apart from its actual economic impact. 279 This interpretation might sup-
port a challenge to an Urban Garden District designation. The argument 
would be that by zoning land for an urban garden, the government is in 
effect taking it for the public purpose of fostering community gardens. 
If government wants local residents to join together to garden, let the 
government offer this option on public land. The burden of an Urban 
Garden zone is signifi cant because it is highly restrictive and much 
more restrictive than the zoning of adjacent properties, which could be 
zoned for residential or other development uses. Even if the property 
had virtually no value at the outset, the “character” of this burden is 
perhaps distinctively onerous. 
 This is an argument that could fi nd a sympathetic audience. After 
all, why should one urban land owner be limited to garden uses, while 
his neighbors may build houses? At fi rst glance, the agricultural zoning 
cases seem to provide a response: the courts overwhelmingly uphold 
zoning land for agricultural uses, when a reasonable governmental pur-
pose is at least fairly debatable. The mere restriction of a property to 
agricultural use is not fatal. Upon closer examination, the strength of 
this argument dims somewhat because most types of agricultural zon-
ing also allow construction of single family residences, although at very 
277. Id. at 543.
278. For an argument that Lingle has made the character element irrelevant, see 
Dale A. Whitman, Deconstructing Lingle: Implications for Takings Doctrine, 40 J. Mar-
shall L. Rev. 573 (2007).
279. The concept of unfairness has the fl avor of an equal protection argument. It 
would be unfortunate if Lingle, after striving to remove substantive due process from 
the takings analysis, were to bring in a confusing equal protection element.
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low densities, or the possibility of other uses by special exception. 280 
Nonetheless, this additional opportunity for development makes a dif-
ference in very few cases, so it does not completely undercut the value 
of the agricultural zoning example. In addition, courts have upheld ag-
ricultural zones that allow only agriculture and no other uses. 281 
 A more signifi cant drawback is that virtually none of the agricultural 
zoning cases go beyond a simple  Lucas -type inquiry to a  Penn Cen-
tral analysis, so they do not tell us how the character concept might be 
handled. 282 As noted earlier, most of them simply say that the property 
retains value for agriculture. One exception in this regard is  Gardner 
v. New Jersey Pinelands Commission , 283 which considers the applica-
tion of  Penn Central to New Jersey’s protection of an area called the 
Pinelands. The complexities of the state’s comprehensive Pinelands 
protection plan are not important here; the pertinent point is that the 
plaintiff wanted to subdivide farmland for residences and alleged that 
the state’s refusal to allow such development was a taking. The New 
Jersey court’s  Penn Central analysis was relatively sparse; here it is in 
its entirety: 
 Plaintiff’s claim fails under the  Penn Central analysis. The CMP does not change 
or prohibit an existing use of the land when applied to plaintiff’s farm. Like Penn 
Central, plaintiff may continue the existing, admittedly benefi cial use of the property. 
Further, although whether Penn Central could again make use of all of its property, 
particularly the airspace over its terminal, was unclear, plaintiff may gainfully use 
all of his property, including the right to build fi ve homes clustered together on the 
restricted land. There also is no showing that the economic impact of the regulations 
interferes with distinct investment-backed expectations. In addition, Penn Central 
could offset its loss by transferring valuable property rights to other properties, even 
if such transfers did not fully compensate it. Plaintiff possesses the similar right to 
offsetting benefi ts; it may receive Pinelands Development Credits in return for re-
cording the deed restrictions. Finally, there is no invidious or arbitrary unfairness in 
the application of the regulatory scheme. Gardner’s neighbors in Uplands Agricul-
tural Areas are burdened by exactly the same restrictions, and other landowners in the 
280. See, e.g., Bell River Assocs. v. China Charter Twp, 565 N.W.2d 695 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1997) (agricultural uses include single family homes as well as other special uses 
allowed by permission).
281. In many cases, the court does not specify whether uses in addition to agricul-
ture are allowed. Some cases expressly approve exclusively agricultural zones. See 
Gisler v. County of Madera, 112 Cal. Rptr. 919 (Ct. App. 1974); Wilson v. County of 
McHenry, 416 N.E.2d 426 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (160 acre lot minimum); Chokecherry 
Hills Estates, Inc. v. Deuel County, 294 N.W.2d 654 (S.D. 1980); see also Joyce v. 
City of Portland, 546 P.2d 1100 (Or. Ct. App. 1976) (holding no taking occurred when 
agricultural use was still permitted).
282. This might be explained by the relative antiquity of many of the cases, some 
of which were decided before Penn Central, and most of which were decided before 
Lingle.
283. Gardner v. N.J. Pinelands Comm’n, 593 A.2d 251 (N.J. 1991).
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Pinelands must abide by comparable regulations as part of an integrated comprehen-
sive plan designed to benefi t both the region and the public. 284 
 This analysis does focus on the unfairness concern in the portion that 
arguably concerns “character” and notes that the plaintiff suffers from 
the scheme no more than his neighbors. An urban garden plot owner 
might argue that he is different; he alone (or relatively alone, because 
the city plans a network of urban gardens) bears the urban garden dis-
trict restriction. 
 When a court evaluates a taking it does not look at the uses or value 
that have been prohibited; it considers the uses or value that remain, 
and asks whether the owner retains suffi cient use or value that there has 
been no regulatory taking. 285 If the city can show that the use of the land 
for urban gardens offers a viable economic use to the owner, the city can 
argue that the zoning is not unduly restrictive. Although neighboring 
properties might be zoned for business or housing, it is a fact of life in 
zoning that different districts allow different uses; a community garden 
inevitably will be located adjacent to other, more intensive uses. 286 
 This response is somewhat unsatisfactory from an intellectual per-
spective because it says, in essence, that the character of the restriction 
does not matter because not all value has been taken. Yet it seems con-
sistent with the broader concept of a regulatory taking as functionally 
equivalent to government confi scation: as long as some economically 
viable private use remains, the owner has suffered regulation, not a taking. 
 3. GREEN SPACE ZONING 
 All of the takings arguments become much stronger, of course, for 
land that is zoned for green space. The  Re-Imagining report discusses a 
range of possible “green infrastructure” uses, including parks and pub-
lic green space, stormwater management areas, and wildlife habitat. 287 
 To some extent, green space and development might be compatible. 
If a portion of a parcel can be developed in some manner, while leav-
ing suffi cient unpaved area for stormwater management or habitat, ar-
guably we are in a  Penn Central setting. As the  Penn Central Court 
284. Id. at 261 (citations omitted).
285. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978).
286. See, e.g., Puritan-Greenfi eld Improvement Ass’n v. Leo, 153 N.W.2d 162, 
170-71 (Mich. Ct. App. 1967) (noting that adjacency to more intensive uses is “char-
acteristic” of the end of one zoning district and the beginning of another). For another 
analysis of the “character” concept, see Christopher T. Goodin, The Role and Content 
of the Character of the Governmental Action Factor in a Partial Regulatory Takings 
Analysis, 29 U. Haw. L. Rev. 437 (2007).
287. Re-Imagining supra note 18, at 8.
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explained, when evaluating a taking we look at the parcel as a whole; 
if not all of a parcel is restricted, there is not a total taking. 288 In that 
instance the takings analysis would be similar to that above, though 
with the added chore of identifying the relevant parcel for the “parcel 
as a whole.” 289 
 If any of the green space options preclude any form of economic ac-
tivity, they look much more like a taking under  Lucas . If none of a par-
cel of property can be developed because it is designated as a retention 
basin for stormwater management or a wildlife habitat, the property 
has no value to the owner. All of the property’s value has been taken 
for a public purpose and the  Lucas argument is particularly strong. The 
 Lucas majority noted that regulations requiring land “to be left substan-
tially in its natural state” carry “a heightened risk that private property 
is being pressed into some form of public service. . . .” 290 
 For this reason it is highly unlikely that the city would attempt to 
zone any land that is privately held for exclusive use as “green infra-
structure.” Any such rezoning on private land would be vulnerable to 
attack as a taking. 
 B.  Spot Zoning and Equal Protection Objections 
to an Urban Garden Zone 
 The above discussion focuses on takings law because it is an obvious 
issue when a city downzones land to a use such as an urban garden. The 
discussion necessarily includes references to another potential legal 
challenge to an urban garden zone: the argument that the zoning power 
has not been exercised rationally and does not satisfy the “fairly debat-
able” standard. Other legal arguments that might arise stem from the 
concept of unfairness. These are the state law argument that an urban 
garden zone might be unlawful “spot zoning,” and a state or federal 
constitutional argument that singling out one parcel for rezoning might 
be an equal protection violation. 
288. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 130-31. The Court explained:
“Taking” jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and 
attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely ab-
rogated. In deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking, 
this Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the nature and 
extent of the interference with rights in parcel as a whole—here, the city tax block 
designated as the “landmark site.”
Id.
289. See, e.g., Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 208 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 
2000) (evaluating the appropriate parcel for purposes of a takings analysis).
290. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1018 (1992).
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 Litigants raise the challenge of “spot zoning” when they think that 
one parcel has been singled out for different zoning treatment than the 
areas around it. 291 Usually the parcel has been rezoned to a more inten-
sive use than that of its neighbors, such as a large apartment building 
allowed in a single family home district. Rezoning to a less intensive 
use (as in the urban garden setting) can be called “reverse spot zoning.” 
The concept has a visual element: a small tract rezoning will show up 
on a zoning map as a visible “spot,” surrounded by other, different uses. 
Spot zoning is not always unlawful; rather, the existence of small tract 
rezoning is the starting point for a court’s analysis of whether the re-
zoning complies with zoning laws, including the SZEA’s concept that 
a municipality’s overall zoning scheme must be in accord with a “com-
prehensive plan.” 292 In addition, of course, the spot zoning must survive 
the “fairly debatable” standard. 293 
 A tract of land with the urban garden zoning designation runs the risk 
of looking like a spot on the Cleveland zoning map. (Of course, if the 
city carries out its plan of fostering a large number of urban gardens, the 
zoning map might appear to be dotted with such spots.) The city would 
have to defend the zone by demonstrating that, rather than an aberration, 
the urban garden zones have been mapped on the basis of a comprehen-
sive plan; that the rezoning does not adversely affect the neighbors; and 
that each zone has been selected on the basis of a rational factual fi nding 
that the land and location are suitable for the zoning. 294 
 An equal protection challenge takes the spot zoning concept (“this 
tract has been treated differently from others around it”) and clothes 
it in constitutional garb. Here the argument would be that selection of 
a particular tract as an urban garden zone is a form of discrimination. 
291. See Juergensmeyer & Roberts, supra note 1, at 242.
292. Standard State Zoning Enabling Act § 3, reprinted in Mandelker, supra note 1, 
at 4.16. Courts generally consider factors such as the impact of the use as rezoned on the 
surrounding area, the size of the area or number of owners benefi ted, and whether the 
rezoning is consistent with a comprehensive plan. Compare Greater Yellowstone Coal., 
Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm’rs., 25 P.3d 168, 172 (Mont. 2001) (small tract rezoning 
unlawful) with Smith v. City of Papillion, 705 N.W.2d 584, 599 (Neb. 2005) (small tract 
rezoning upheld).
293. See Juergensmeyer & Roberts, supra note 1, at 242.
294. Spot zoning cases do not appear to be frequently litigated in Ohio. The Ohio 
Supreme Court has defi ned spot zoning as “the singling out of a lot or a small area 
for discriminatory or different treatment from that accorded surrounding land which is 
similar in character.” Willott v. Vill. of Beachwood, 197 N.E.2d 201, 203 (Ohio 1964). 
Following the lead of this case (which held that an 80-acre tract rezoning was not a 
“spot”), the Ohio courts appear to apply a fairly simple test based on the Willott descrip-
tion. See, e.g., Menges v. Sugarcreek, No. 89AP070059, 1989 Ohio Ct. App. LEXIS 
4825, at *1-3 (Ct. App. Dec. 21, 1989).
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Under Supreme Court doctrine, however, economic discrimination in 
this form need survive only a “rational basis” test: such a statutory clas-
sifi cation is valid if there is “any reasonably conceivable state of facts 
that could provide a rational basis for the classifi cation.” 295 For all of the 
reasons detailed above, the city is likely to be able to survive an equal 
protection challenge. 296 
 C. Brownfi elds in the Shrinking City 
 One fi nal issue must be identifi ed, although it is not a land use issue in 
the narrow sense. The soil in Cleveland displays its urban and industrial 
heritage, as urban soils commonly are compromised by the presence 
of petrochemicals, lead or other contaminants. Some of these so-called 
“brownfi eld” sites are old industrial areas with signifi cant contamination 
that merit a structured and comprehensive cleanup; many are relatively 
mildly contaminated, as a side effect of being located in an aging urban 
area. It is virtually impossible to place a price tag on such remediation, 
as it depends on the nature and extent of the contamination, so the prac-
tical impact of the issue is uncertain. The  Re-Imagining report includes 
concern about remediation, noting that “environmental contaminants 
abound in places where development demand is very limited or in some 
cases, non-existent.” 297 This is a signifi cant observation because, as  Re-
Imagining points out, “[r]esources for cleaning up brownfi elds sites are 
typically tied to new development projects.” 298 Indeed, our legal struc-
ture for cleaning up contaminated sites rests in large part on the use 
of private funding or—more recently—public funding available where 
there is a likelihood that a cleaned-up site can offer economic devel-
opment benefi ts. Thus the shrinking city faces another hurdle: a pro-
spective “green” use probably requires cleanup of contaminants to the 
maximum extent appropriate to protect human health and the environ-
ment, but the resources available to the shrinking city are limited. 
 A comprehensive review of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, 
but in general the federal contaminated site cleanup program depends on 
295. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993); see Blust v. City of 
Blue Ash, 894 N.E.2d 89, 94 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008) (offering that a comparable rational 
basis test applies under state law in Ohio); see also Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 
U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding a restriction on boarding houses as having a rational basis).
296. The Equal Protection argument gains greater weight if the plaintiff can allege 
and show a racial motivation in selecting a particular parcel of land, thereby trigger-
ing strict scrutiny of the classifi cation. Juergensmeyer & Roberts, supra note 1, at 
10.14.A (2007).
297. Re-Imagining, supra note 18, at 24.
298. Id.
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private funding: it imposes cleanup liability on an array of individuals 
who can be linked to the hazardous substances contaminating a particu-
lar site. 299 This liability structure was imposed under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) 
in 1980. 300 Decades of CERCLA litigation ensued as each of these “po-
tentially responsible parties” (PRPs) sought to fi nd as many other PRPs 
as possible, to fund the cleanup of these severely contaminated sites. In 
addition, fear of liability under CERCLA added to disincentives to invest 
in older industrial sites in cities such as Cleveland: rather than run the 
risk of acquiring an environmental catastrophe, developers and industry 
would seek out untouched “greenfi eld” sites at the edge of town. 301 
 This effect of CERCLA (whether real or only perceived) 302 prompted 
concern about the fate of “brownfi elds”—industrial sites that were not 
clean, but that also were not so severely contaminated as to merit an 
EPA-mandated CERCLA cleanup. 303 After initial resistance, during the 
299. Federal cleanups occur under the auspices of the Comprehensive Environmen-
tal Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, or “CERCLA” the so-called Superfund 
law. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9628 (2010). The statute imposes liability on the entities that 
generated the hazardous substances or arranged for disposal of substances they owned 
or possessed; those who transported hazardous substances to a disposal site they se-
lected; and the current or past owners or operators of the site at which the hazardous 
substances were found. § 9607(a). Current owners and operators of the site are liable 
unless they can qualify for an exemption; past owners and operators are liable only if 
they owned or operated “at the time of disposal.” Id. All categories of potentially re-
sponsible parties benefi t from only very limited defenses: they must be able to show that 
the contamination is caused solely by an act of God, an act of war, or the act or omission 
of a third party under very limited circumstances. § 9607(b).
300. §§ 9601-9628.
301. See, e.g., Joel B. Eisen, Brownfi elds at Twenty: A Critical Reevaluation, 34 
Fordham Urb. L.J. 721, 730-35 (2007) (describing this as the “brownfi elds story” and 
questioning its accuracy). Although there is an “innocent purchaser” defense for the 
purchaser who conducts a Phase I and fi nds nothing, the defense is so surrounded by 
conditions that the prudent investor would seek to avoid the risk of liability; in addi-
tion, the “innocent purchaser” defense in its original form offered no protection to the 
purchaser whose Phase I detected the presence of contamination. Faith R. Dylewski, 
Comment, Ohio’s Brownfi eld Problem and Possible Solutions: What is Required for 
A Successful Brownfi eld Initiative?, 35 Akron L. Rev. 81 (2001).
302. See Eisen, supra note 301, at 730-35.
303. CERCLA, as amended, defi nes a brownfi elds site as “real property, the expan-
sion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may be complicated by the presence or potential 
presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant.” § 9601(39)(A). Sites that 
are the subject to mandatory CERCLA removal actions or listed on the CERCLA Na-
tional Priorities List of severely contaminated sites are not eligible for “brownfi eld” sta-
tus under federal law. § 9601(39)(B). Some commentators object that state brownfi elds 
programs have come to include sites that should have been subject to a more formal 
mandatory cleanup. E.g., David A. Dana, State Brownfi elds Programs as Laboratories 
of Democracy?, 14 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 86, 92-93 (2005). In addition to CERCLA, 
many states passed their own environmental cleanup laws that followed the CERCLA 
pattern. See Dylewski, supra note 301, at 91.
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1990s the federal EPA began to consider making accommodations to 
purchasers of brownfi eld sites, 304 and in 2002 Congress enacted amend-
ments to the statute, the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfi elds 
Revitalization Act. 305 The goal was to foster redevelopment: as EPA’s 
brownfi elds program description asserts, “Cleaning up and reinvesting 
in these properties protects the environment, reduces blight, and takes 
development pressures off greenspaces and working lands.” 306 The leg-
islation included new liability protections for purchasers of property 
with known contamination who agree to cooperate with a cleanup ac-
tion. 307 The law also provided a defense to liability for a government 
entity that acquired a brownfi eld property involuntarily through bank-
ruptcy, tax delinquency, or abandonment, or by exercising its power of 
eminent domain, as long as the local government was not responsible 
for the contamination at the site and the site was not subject to an EPA-
mandated CERCLA cleanup. 308 Both of these changes helped to dimin-
ish the fear that acquiring a brownfi eld would be a source of fi nancial 
disaster for the new landowner; liability of other PRPs associated with 
the site remained unchanged. 
 1. STATE BROWNFIELD PROGRAMS 
 In the meantime, states were taking the lead with their own programs 
to encourage reuse of brownfi elds. 309 A key feature of these programs 
was an effort to encourage voluntary private action to clean up mildly 
contaminated sites: unlike CERCLA with its threat of sweeping liabil-
ity, these laws rely on carrots, not sticks. 310 States wanted to encour-
age productive reuse of old industrial sites, and they designed their 
304. See Jonathan D. Weiss, The Clinton Administration’s Brownfi elds Initiative, 
in Brownfields: A Comprehensive Guide to Redeveloping Contaminated 
Property 41 (Todd S. Davis & Kevin D. Margolis eds., 1997). The EPA program is 
also described in Dylewski, supra note 301, at 99-103 (article written before the 2002 
amendments to CERCLA).
305. §§ 9604-9605, 9607, 9622, 9628.
306. EPA.gov, Brownfi elds and Land Revitalization, http://www.epa.gov/brown
fi elds/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2010).
307. § 9601(40).
308. § 9601(20)(D), (35)(A)(ii).
309. See Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, Legislative Innovation in State Brownfi elds 
Development Programs, 16 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 1, 61 (2001) (includes list of state 
brownfi elds statutes).
310. E.g., Dana, supra note 303, at 86, 107 n.2 (“In popular and academic com-
mentary, the term brownfi elds is sometimes used to cover all voluntary cleanups under 
state statute that does not follow the CERCLA model . . .”). “Because developers en-
gage voluntarily . . . they presumably lack culpability, and therefore, control the timing, 
sequencing, and even the comprehensiveness of remediation and reuse.” Eisen, supra 
note 301, at 721, 730
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brownfi elds programs to be developer-friendly: the voluntary cleanup 
system is intended to provide technical assistance to the developer, to 
encourage cleanup and productive (meaning tax-revenue-generating 
and job-generating) reuse. 311 Indeed, the programs have been criticized 
for being too kind to developers, thereby exposing the public to envi-
ronmental contaminants at redeveloped brownfi elds. 312 They also have 
been criticized for harboring overly-optimistic views of the develop-
ment that might ensue. 313 
 The voluntary brownfi elds process can be attractive to a private de-
veloper who wants to avoid surprises and undue expense. Usually it 
includes the possibility of a lesser cleanup standard than the feared 
CERCLA “edible and drinkable” level, by restricting the future use of 
the land. 314 Thus, for example, a state could restrict property to indus-
trial or commercial use, and prohibit residential development. 315 Instead 
of fully cleaning the soil or groundwater, the state could allow the de-
veloper to use physical barriers designed to reduce human exposure 
to the site, such as fencing, pavement, or an impervious cap covering 
the contaminated soil. 316 State brownfi elds programs also allow for the 
use of innovative cleanup techniques (including research into biore-
mediation) because they are not subject to the restrictive standards of 
CERCLA. 317 
 State voluntary cleanup programs are not particularly hospitable to 
the urban gardener. They rely on attracting industrial or commercial 
developers who can pay for the cleanup, with the hope of subsequent 
profi table redevelopment of the property. At their inception, these laws 
311. See Eisen, supra note 301, at 721 (a basic principle of a redevelopment program 
which provides incentives for remediation and redevelopment).
312. Id. at 732, n.60 (criticizing the programs of many states, and especially New 
Jersey, for being overly “developer-centered”); Dana, supra note 303, at 87-88, 93-94 
(criticizing state programs for including severely contaminated sites in their brown-
fi elds voluntary cleanups, noting that inadequate cleanup can lead to reuse of sites that 
increase human exposures).
313. Eisen, supra note 301, at 733-34.
314. E.g. id. at 736-37; see also Robertson, supra note 309, at 4-5 (noting that many 
states have allowed cleanup to vary depending on the future use of the land).
315. See Robertson, supra note 309, at 8-9.
316. The plan also could include an institutional control such as a deed restriction 
on reuse prohibiting future residential development, a local zoning restriction, or some 
other administrative or legal tool to prevent public exposure to contaminants. A Citi-
zen’s Guide to Understanding Institutional Controls at Superfund, Brownfi elds, Federal 
Facilities, Underground Storage Tank, and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
Cleanups, U.S. EPA (Offi ce of Solid Wastes and Emergency Response Feb. 2005). Rob-
ertson, supra note 309, at 15-16 (criticizing reliance on institutional controls or lesser 
cleanup standards).
317. See Dana, supra note 303, at 96 n.32.
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were concerned with redevelopment and were not focused on a goal of 
producing a clean environment for its own sake. 
 An additional issue for the shrinking city is that many green uses 
are unlikely to be eligible for relaxed cleanup standards. Ohio’s Volun-
tary Action Program, for example, would require land used for urban 
farming to be cleaned up to residential standards—the strictest standard 
of cleanup. 318 Few of us would feel comfortable purchasing vegetables 
from an urban garden that was on soil not cleaned up to the most strin-
gent environmental standards. Some urban gardeners seek to avoid the 
soil issue by building raised beds on impervious surfaces such as park-
ing lots: the vegetables grow in a combination of mulch and topsoil with 
the parking lot beneath. 319 There is also considerable interest in urban 
greenhouses, which similarly should not require full cleanup of under-
lying soils. 320 But for any urban gardener who wishes to use the native 
soil, the contamination problem can be signifi cant. 
 2.  HOW DO WE PAY FOR CLEANUP 
IN A SHRINKING CITY? 
 Traditionally, both CERCLA and state voluntary cleanup laws relied 
heavily on private funding. CERCLA imposes liability on private per-
sons who can be held responsible for contamination; state voluntary 
cleanup programs enlist the help of private entities who want to clean 
up properties with the expectation of profi table redevelopment. Over 
time, however, it became apparent that private funding would not al-
ways be available and that the public needed to play some role. Thus 
both the federal government, through the 2002 CERCLA amendments, 
and various state programs began to offer sources of public funding. 
Much of this funding is linked to the profi table redevelopment of the 
contaminated property, but there are exceptions: both the federal gov-
318. See Ohio Admin. Code 3745:300-08(A), (C); :300-11(A), (D) (2010).
319. See Gather ‘Round Farm; Urban Gardens, http://gatherroundfarm.webs.com 
(last visited Mar. 31, 2010).
320. For example, one project in Cleveland would establish a signifi cant urban 
greenhouse, using an employee-owned cooperative model:
Another cooperative in development ($10 million in federal loans and grants al-
ready in hand) is Green City Growers, which will build and operate a year-round hy-
droponic food production greenhouse in the midst of urban Cleveland. The 230,000-
square-foot greenhouse—larger than the average Wal-Mart superstore—will be 
producing more than 3 million heads of fresh lettuce and nearly a million pounds of 
(highly profi table) basil and other herbs a year, and will almost certainly become the 
largest urban food-producing greenhouse in the country.
Gar Alperovitz et al., The Cleveland Model, Nation (Mar. 1, 2010), available at http://
www.thenation.com/doc/20100301/alperowitz_et_al/single.
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ernment and Ohio offer the possibility of public funds for land intended 
for green uses. 
 In the shrinking city setting, we can assume that many mildly con-
taminated properties are owned by the city or by persons who are not 
capable of bearing the cost of cleanup. It is doubtful that a resident who 
has defaulted on a mortgage, for example, can help pay for remediation. 
A lender who forecloses on a contaminated property is not liable as an 
“owner” under CERCLA. 321 An urban farmer does not have deep pockets. 
Cleveland has a rich heritage of an active nonprofi t community focused 
on community development, 322 but the cost of cleanup can be daunting. 
 Thus the fi nancial resources available to a shrinking city are limited: 
it must look into its own pockets, or perhaps those of the state or fed-
eral governments. There is some chance of funding at the federal level. 
For example, federal grant funds for site assessments and cleanup are 
not necessarily tied to the prospect of redevelopment; EPA focuses on 
benefi ts to human health and the environment, and benefi t to the commu-
nity. 323 While many of the federal grant success stories feature traditional 
redevelopment, one example celebrates the use of federal funds to clean 
up and preserve a community garden in Sacramento, California, 324 and 
another describes restoring an estuarine environment. 325 
 Of course, there is no guarantee that federal funds will be available, 
and it is apparent that EPA favors projects that will lead to redevelop-
ment. In announcing new grants this year, for example, EPA noted that 
the grants “will stimulate and accelerate the pace of cleanup and re-
development of brownfi elds sites, and will create jobs . . . Communi-
ties, states, and tribes need this now more than ever.” 326 Even with the 
321. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (E)(2002).
322. Lind, supra note 28, at 240.
323. Envtl. Prot. Agency, FY09 Guidelines for Brownfi elds Assessment Grants at 
24-25, available at http://www.epa.gov/oswer/docs/grants/epa-oswer-oblr-08-07.pdf; 
Envtl. Prot. Agency, FY09 Guidelines for Brownfi elds Revolving Loan Fund (RLF) 
Grants at 16-17, available at http://www.epa.gov/oswer/docs/grants/epa-oswer-oblr-
08-09.pdf; Envtl. Prot. Agency, FY09 Guidelines for Brownfi elds Cleanup Grants at 
25-26, available at http://www.epa.gov/oswer/docs/grants/epa-oswer-oblr-08-08.pdf.
324. See Envtl. Prot. Agency, Capital Area Development Authority, CA: Cleanup 
Grant (Aug. 2006), http://www.epa.gov/brownfi elds/success/sacramento_ca_BRAG.
pdf. Another cleanup effort was for a dog park. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Culver City, CA: 
Petroleum Assessment and Cleanup Grants (Nov. 2008), http://www.epa.gov/brown
fi elds/success/culver_city_ca_brag.pdf.
325. See Envtl. Prot. Agency, Jamestown S’Klallam Tribe, Sequim Bay, WA: Cleanup 
Grant (Sept. 2008), http://www.epa.gov/brownfi elds/success/sequimbaywabrag.pdf
326. EPA to Award Nearly $112 Million in Grants For Cleanup, Land-Revitalization 
Projects, 40 Env’t Rep. 1121 (May 15, 2009).
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infusion of additional funds from the 2009 stimulus package (for which 
the twenty percent participation requirement for cleanup grants was 
waived), however, EPA awarded grants to 252 applicants out of about 
700 grant applications. 327 
 State-funded cleanup programs might offer funding opportunities, 
although they tend to link funding to redevelopment. 328 In Ohio, this 
link is an element of the state’s major initiative, the Clean Ohio fund 
program. The fund is created by public bonds issued by the state; it is 
administered by the Clean Ohio Council, which is housed in the Ohio 
Department of Development. 329 Clean Ohio offers local governments 
and nonprofi t organizations 330 grants and loans for brownfi elds inves-
tigation and cleanup. 331 The statute specifi es that the applicant must 
describe the economic benefi t that will result from cleaning up the 
brownfi eld, 332 and it authorizes the director of development to set pri-
orities among the applicants. 333 
327. Id.; Analysis Says Economic Stimulus Package Offers Projects Broad Funding 
Opportunities, 40 Env’t Rep. 428 (February 27, 2009); see also Bartsch, Increased 
Funding, Flexibility, Simplicity Suggested for Brownfi elds Program, 37 Env’t Rep. 
1975 (Sept. 22, 2006) (“Over the past two years, EPA has denied nearly 800 grant appli-
cations, including 460 cleanup grant proposals, because it did not have enough funding 
to meet qualifying demand.”).
328. This restriction applies in Massachusetts. Mass Development, Brownfi elds 
Redevelopment Fund, http://www.massdevelopment.com/fi nancing/specialty-loan-
programs/brownfi elds-redevelopment-fund/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2010); see Julianne 
Kurdila & Elise Rindfl eisch, Funding Opportunities for Brownfi eld Redevelopment, 34 
B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 479, 489-91 (2007); see also Mass. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 
Brownfi elds Introduction, http://www.mass.gov/dep/cleanup/brint.htm (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2010)
State brownfi elds program incentives are available to buyers, and sometimes sell-
ers, of contaminated property provided there is a commitment to cleanup and rede-
velopment. . . . State incentives can help parties identify risk, limit liability, and fund 
the cleanup of brownfi elds sites enabling their reuse for industry, housing, and other 
purposes.
Id.
329. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 122.651(F) (LexisNexis 2010) (the Fund is housed 
in the Department of Development; it also coordinates with Ohio EPA). The Clean 
Ohio Fund has four major components: brownfi eld revitalization, farmland preserva-
tion, green space conservation, and recreational trails. The discussion in this paper fo-
cuses on the brownfi eld revitalization program, which is divided into two sections: the 
revitalization fund and the assistance fund. See Clean Ohio Fund, http://clean.ohio.gov 
(last visited Mar. 31, 2010).
330. Id. § 122.65(B) (listing “applicants” as including local government entities, 
nonprofi t organizations, and for-profi t organizations that have entered into an agree-
ment with a local government).
331. Id. § 122.656 (applications for grants for brownfi elds investigation); § 122.657 
(describing criteria for applying for grants for investigation or cleanup).
332. Id. § 122.657(A)(8).
333. Id. § 122.657(D).
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 As implemented, the Clean Ohio Fund selection mechanism favors 
“economic benefi t” as a key factor, and interprets “economic benefi t” to 
mean one thing: jobs. 334 Unfortunately, it might be diffi cult for a small-
scale urban farm or garden to demonstrate a high level of job creation. 
Urban farm enthusiasts are optimistic that they can generate useful em-
ployment, if their plans bear fruit; this remains to be seen. 335 
 Although economic benefi t is only one of several elements for which 
points are awarded in an application for Clean Ohio funds, as a practical 
matter it can be quite signifi cant: a score of zero for economic benefi t 
puts the applicant at a disadvantage. 336 The Clean Ohio Fund is an $800 
334. See Clean Ohio Fund, Clean Ohio Revitalization Fund Application for Fund-
ing: Guidance for Part B Known End User Track (May 2009), http://clean.ohio.
gov/BrownfieldRevitalization/Documents/CORF_ApplicationPage/CORF_PartB_
ScoringGuidanceKEU_052009.pdf; Clean Ohio Fund, Clean Ohio Revitalization Fund 
Application for Funding: Guidance for Part B Redevelopment Ready Track (May 
2009), http://clean.ohio.gov/Brownfi eldRevitalization/Documents/CORF_Application
Page/CORF_PartB_ScoringGuidanceRRTrack_052009.pdf; Clean Ohio Fund, Clean 




335. Many urban farms are relatively small operations, operated by their owners. 
One project underway in Cleveland—the Green City Growers urban greenhouse—
could provide a slightly higher number of jobs. It is part of a group of employee-owned 
cooperative enterprises planned for the Cleveland inner city. Alperovitz, supra note 
320. In addition, the Cuyahoga County Land Bank seeks to encourage urban agricul-
ture as a workforce-training tool: “As compared to rural agriculture, urban agriculture 
attempts to integrate [agricultural] activities into the urban economic and ecological 
system. These linkages include the involvement of urban residents to meet labor needs 
(workforce development) and the use of typical urban resources.” Cuyahoga Land 
Bank, Demolition and Vacant Lot Re-Use, supra note 55. The proponents of an urban 
farm in Detroit, Hantz City Growers, assert that urban farms could provide “hundreds” 
of green jobs. See Hantz Farms Detroit, supra note 67 (discussing green jobs for local 
residents).
336. The statutory language allows an argument that the Clean Ohio funds should be 
available for redevelopment in the form of urban agriculture or urban gardening. The 
statute itself does not defi ne “economic benefi t,” see Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 122.65 
(LexisNexis 2010), and certainly does not restrict it to job creation. Both commercial 
and community gardens confer an “economic benefi t,” broadly defi ned, by providing a 
source of food and, in the case of urban agriculture or market gardens, actual income 
for the gardener. At this point, in the state’s view a community garden is not an eco-
nomic benefi t; it is a community benefi t. But a shrinking city has a good argument that 
development for urban gardening is a better alternative than simply letting the land sit, 
contaminated and unused. This is particularly compelling in a city like Cleveland where 
there are private entities (urban farmers and community development corporations) who 
are willing to undertake or organize urban gardening, if the soil is clean.
The statutory argument is weaker for cleanup of contaminated property that is des-
tined for ecological infrastructure such as fl ood plains. Here, it is more diffi cult to argue 
that there is an economic benefi t of the type the Clean Ohio statute might envision. 
Fortunately for Cleveland, Ohio has a separate program that offers funding for im-
provements that protect waterways from nonpoint source pollution, such as polluted
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million bond fund, and all expenditures go through a competitive ap-
plication process. 337 The state has strong incentives to favor projects 
with a clear and signifi cant economic payback in the form of jobs. Ohio 
and other states suffer from a chronic shortage of funds to deal with 
environmental cleanup. 338 
 In summary, shrinking cities confront a legacy of environmental con-
tamination that they may have few ready resources to combat. Although 
they may argue that their projects are eligible to compete for state or 
federal funding for brownfi eld remediation, their appeals for funds may 
be at a disadvantage when compared to projects that promise more lu-
crative reinvestment after cleanup. 
 IV. Conclusion 
 The problem of the shrinking city offers a fascinating variation on many 
of the themes of land use law. For the past two hundred years our expec-
tation has been growth, not shrinkage, and our land use system has been 
focused on how to manage expansion, rather than decline. The regu-
latory system we have developed is suffi ciently fl exible to handle the 
runoff. See Ohio.gov: Environmental Protection Agency, http://www.epa.state.oh.us/
defa/comguide.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2010) (providing links to Ohio cleanup pro-
grams). Cleaning contaminated land could reduce contaminants in urban runoff. Other 
land uses envisioned in Re-Imagining could be helpful in this regard also. Cities such as 
Cleveland are spending hundreds of millions of dollars to combat problems with com-
bined sewer overfl ows (CSO), in which stormwaters combine with sanitary sewer lines, 
leading to overfl ows of untreated sewage into streams and lakes during wet weather. See 
Northeast Ohio Regional Sewer District, What is a CSO?, http://www.neorsd.org/cso.
php (last visited Mar. 31, 2010). The CSO problem is caused in part by the high percent-
age of impervious surfaces in urban areas. See Re-Imagining, supra note 18.
Prior to urban settlement, the land in Cleveland was able to absorb much of the rain 
as it fell. . . . As the city grew, the percentage of impervious surfaces such as streets, 
sidewalks, and roofs . . . increased dramatically. . . . This prevents the natural absorp-
tion of stormwater and results in increased runoff and compromised water quality.
Id. at 20. Re-Imagining points out that planting trees on vacant lots would reduce storm-
water runoff: “If done properly, this would reduce infrastructure costs and improve 
water quality.” Id. at 11. Thus the re-greening of Cleveland could reduce the burden on 
the region’s sewer systems and provide an alternative to the current practice of build-
ing additional water storage capacity and taking other mechanical measures to prevent 
CSOs.
337. See Clean Ohio Fund, Welcome to the Clean Ohio Fund, http://clean.ohio.gov/ 
(last visited Mar. 31, 2010). For a detailed discussion of the Clean Ohio funds and other 
funding mechanisms available in Ohio and other states, see Kurdila & Rindfl eisch, 
supra note 328.
338. As noted even before the current economic crisis began, “the dire budgetary 
situation in many states appears to have stymied environmental enforcement, including 
enforcement under CERCLA and mirror state CERCLA statutes.” Dana, supra note 
303, at 88.
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challenge, but the shrinking city must pick its way carefully, offering 
a documented and persuasive case for each decision to restrict future 
development. A well-advised and careful city can reap the benefi t of 
judicial deference to local decision making and fend off challenges that 
its restrictions amount to a taking of private property or are otherwise 
unlawful as a matter of land use law. As a practical matter, however, 
the shrinking city is likely to face diffi culty in fi nancing its efforts to 
revitalize contaminated areas. 

